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Abstract
This dissertation proposes a model of two-stage process of democratization. In the
first stage, income inequality is associated with political liberalization, but this as-
sociation is conditional on economic development. In the second stage, political
liberalization is associated with democratization. By looking at 125 authoritarian
regimes from 1960 to 2010, I find that in rich countries, high income inequality is
associated with low political liberalization, which may stabilize autocratic regimes;
while low income inequality is associated with high political liberalization. In poor
countries, high income inequality is associated with political liberalization, while low
inequality has no effect.
In the second stage, I find that political liberalization, such as electoral component,
liberal component, and participatory component of democracy are associated with
democratization. These components of democracy may help citizens to develop pro-
democracy attitude. This research attempts to extend the understanding of the
relationship between income inequality, economic development, and democratization
by including political liberalization.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: The Myth of Democratization
In this dissertation, I suggest that we may think democratization as a gradual chang-
ing process from autocracy to democracy. That is, an autocratic regime may be-
come more politically liberalized in the first place, and later becomes democracy.
In this democratizing process, I propose that income inequality is associated with
political liberalization, however, this association is conditional on levels of economic
development. For citizens, their demands of property right protection and income
redistribution are based on the interaction between income inequality and economic
development. In order to achieve these demands, citizens may need more political
powers to complete these tasks. Therefore, this dissertation proposes a two-stage
process of democratization. In the first stage of the process, income inequality is
associated with political liberalization, but the effect is conditional on economic de-
velopment. In the second stage of the process, political liberalization is associated
with democratization.
Take Taiwan: During the Martial Law period (1948−1987), the KMT government
prohibited the formation of new political parties and also suspended national elec-
tions, including Legislative Yuan Elections and National Assembly Elections. How-
ever, the KMT government maintained local elections since 1950, such as city and
township mayor and council elections, which were introduced during the Japanese
colonial period.1 Citizens on Taiwan also voted directly for the representatives of the
1However, some of the higher levels of local elections where are suspended, such as Taipei Mayor
Election, Taiwan Province Governor Election.
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Legislative Council for the Taiwan province. We can see that even under autocratic
rule, the KMT government still allowed some forms of democratic institutions.
In 1969, the KMT government announced the first “supplementary” legislative
election to fill in vacant seats in the Legislative Yuan, but this election was still far
from free and fair. The KMT government continued to hold supplementary elections
every three years until 1989 after the end of the Martial Law. Before ending the
Martial Law, the independent candidates already formed an informal party organi-
zation called “Dangwai”, meaning outside of the KMT party, to participate in the
political process, especially in elections. In 1986, the Dangwai politicians announced
the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taipei. In the end, the
KMT government did not take any actions to crack down the DPP. Instead, in the
next year, the KMT government officially ended the Martial Law.
After lifting the Martial Law, Taiwan launched series of political reform, but these
reforms took awhile to be achieved. That is, Taiwan gradually liberalized the politics
before Taiwan became a democracy. From an electoral perspective on democracy,
political reforms in autocracies promote a more free and fair election. Taiwan held
the first multi-party national election for the National Assembly in 1991 and the first
multi-party national legislative election in 1992. In 1994, Taiwan also had elections
for Taipei City Mayor, Kaohsiung City Mayor, and the Governor of Taiwan Province.
Eventually, Taiwan held its first free and fair presidential election in 1996, which is the
year of democratic transition for Taiwan that identified by many scholars (Cheibub,
Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). Also from a civil liberty perspective, many civil liberties
became protected by laws during this period, such as freedom of speech and freedom
of press. At the meantime, the KMT government became more constrained by The
Additional Articles of the Constitution, which were constitutional amendments to
the original constitution. Lastly, from a participatory perspective, citizens are free
to form civil organizations and more social and political groups.
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Taiwan gained a notable economic growth during its political transition period
from the 1970s and the 1990s. Most scholars attribute the success of the democratic
transition in Taiwan to economic prosperity (e.g. Cheng, 1989; Huntington, 1991).
They argue that economic development brought the fast growing of civil society or-
ganizations, higher education, middle class, and so on, which are central elements to
democratization. However, many of them downplay the effect of income inequality
and may overestimate the effect of economic development. Economic development
is certainly very important, but income inequality is also important in shaping the
meaning of economic development. For example, an equal and rich society means
citizens are equally rich. But an equal society can also mean citizens are equally poor
when the economy is bad.
In sum, I observe two important perspectives of democratization from Taiwan’s
democratic transition, and this may be generalizable to other democratization cases.
First, democratization involves the increase of levels of political liberalization. This
means that democratization can also be a slow and progressing movement, which
starts from low levels of political liberalization to high levels political liberalization.
Second, the effects of income inequality and economic development are associated
with political liberalization. However, both effects do not work independently, their
interactions may associate with different levels of political liberalization. Therefore,
in this dissertation, I propose that the process of democratization is a two-stage pro-
cess, that countries accrue political liberalization in the first stage, and they become
democracy in the second stage.
1.1 Democratization in the World
In the last half century, democracy has gone up from a relatively rare form of gov-
ernment to a major political institution which has been adopted by most countries




























Number of Democracy and Autocracy by Year
Figure 1.1: Total Number of Democracy and Autocracy: 1950-2010. Source: Democracy
and Dictatorship dataset
this trend spread to Latin American, Asia, and the rest of the world. As described by
Huntington (1991), he optimistically assumes that this wave of democratization will
become an unstoppable global trend. Samuel Huntington might be correct. Figure
1.1 depicts the number of democracies and the number of autocracies from 1950 and
2010, using a dataset from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). There is a clear
trend to show that the total number of independent countries and the total number
of democracies have increased significantly since 1960s. This third wave of democra-
tization means more citizens across the globe are now able to speak freely and elect
their own government.
After World War II, many countries gained its independence. Even though not
every newly independent country was democracy once they gained independence, the
increased number of the independent countries still gives us chances to witness the
increased number of examples of the transition from autocracy to democracy. There
were two major historical events that may explain why there were increased number of
independent countries. The first major event is decolonization from formal European
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colonizers. Decolonization is a fundamental right to self-determination proposed by
the League of Nations and the United Nations, which gives former colonies a new
path to become independent countries (McWhinney, 2007). In the 1960s and the
1970s, the former European colonizers, such as the Uniter Kingdom, France, Spain,
Portugal, and Belgium, recognized the independence of most of their colonies in
Africa. In other parts of the world, those former empires also gradually recognized
their colonies’ independence. According to the United Nations, this self-determination
policy encouraged many countries to gain independence, therefore, the number the
independent countries increased from eighty-two in 1958 to one hundred and twenty-
seven in 1970.
The second major event that contributed to the increase of the independent coun-
tries was the collapse of the Soviet Union after 1989. Many of the former Soviet
Union Republics in Eurasia and Eastern/Central Europe gained independence, such
as Lithuania, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and so on. The number of the independent coun-
tries thus increased from 159 in 1990 to 185 in 1994.2 These two major events provide
a good explanation for why there were more and more independent countries. They
also gives us the opportunity to observe more and more democracies in the world.
Even though Samuel Huntington made a prediction that more and more countries
will become democratic, but Haggard and Kaufman (2016a) suggest that democ-
ratization is a relatively rare event (129). In 2010, approximately forty percent of
the country in the world still remained un-democratic.3 Moreover, according to the
dataset constructed by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010), from 1960 to 2010,
only 110 autocracies experienced a transition to democracy in an dataset of over
4000 observations.4 It seems to us that even though the number of democracies had
2Other non-former Soviet Union countries also contributed to the increased number of indepen-
dent country in the 1990s. For example, former Yugoslavia states, Namibia in 1991, etc.
3This number is consistent across different datasets, such as PolityIV and Freedom House.
4Some countries experienced multiple transitions. For example, Thailand in 2001, 2006.
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increased, the substantial number of autocracies suggests that democratization is not
easy to achieve. Given the optimistic view on the future of democracy by scholars,
why and how is the transition to democracy a difficult and a rare event? What type
of country is more likely to become a democracy and what type of country is less
likely to become a democracy? Based on many of the democratization theories, we
would expect to see some countries become democracies when they fit into categories
such as high income inequality or high economic development, instead of letting the
autocrats continue to rule. But these theories still remain controversial in explaining
democratization, so what has been missed in these theories? In other words, why
have some countries transitioned to democracy, while others never have, even though
a lot of them have met the expectations that scholars suggested?
1.2 Existing Explanations
Where does democratization comes from? From a theoretical perspective, scholars
have pointed out several key explanations that would contribute to democratic tran-
sition. These key variables elaborate the interactions between different actors in the
society, and construct different theoretical frameworks to explain democratic transi-
tion.
There are two major democratization theories, modernization theory and redis-
tributive conflict theory, that both have provided insightful and reasonable theoretical
framework to explain why and how autocracy transitions to democracy. Moderniza-
tion theory mainly focuses on the relationship between the economy and democrati-
zation (e.g. Boix and Stokes, 2003; Lipset, 1959), while redistributive conflict theory
proposes that democratization is correlated with income inequality (e.g. Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003). Modernization theory explains why citizens favor
democracy when their country becomes wealthier. Scholars argue that a wealthier
society means more urbanized and educated nations, which are highly correlated with
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the transition to democracy. However, empirical evidence that tests modernization
theory has been mixed (Przeworski et al., 2000). In some rich countries, there is no
sign of the transition to democracy, such as Singapore. Moreover, democratic tran-
sitions have happened in many poor countries, including the Philippines, Mongolia,
Ghana, and some Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In sum, from empirical evidence, there is no consistent and strong evidence to support
modernization theory.
Redistributive conflict theory provides an alternative framework to explain de-
mocratization. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) propose that society can be divided
into two groups based on their income, which shapes their preferences for the institu-
tional form of the government. For poor citizens, they prefer democracy because of
its credibility of redistributing income in the future, while the elites prefer to remain
with autocratic rule since that would enable them to maintain their power. Inequal-
ity increases demand for democracy by the poor, which forces the rich to choose
democratization whenever the poor pose a credible revolutionary threat. However,
the evidence for the relationship between income inequality and democratization is
also mixed (Houle, 2009; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012).
1.3 Weaknesses of the Existing Explanations
As I mentioned above, there is only weak empirical evidences to support for modern-
ization theory and redistributive conflict theory. Also, most empirical studies on both
theories did not suggest other alternatives to explain the causes of democratization
(Houle, 2009; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012). Therefore, I will identify what existing
scholarship missed and the weakness in their theories, and then I will provide some
solutions to improve the theories. In addition to modernization theory and redis-
tributive theory, this new model may be one of the paths toward democratization.
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1.3.1 The meaning of income inequality
For the existing findings, they could be grouped into two problems. The first problem
is that scholars assume all levels of income inequality and all levels of economic
development are the same. In reality, income inequality means different things at
different levels of economic development. For example, Nepal and Sweden both have
relatively low income inequality, meaning that the wealth is distributed fairly. But
Sweden was a rich country and Nepal was a poor country, this means that citizens in
Sweden were equally rich and citizens in Nepal were equally poor.
The combination of the both economic indicators makes these two economic in-
dicators different from what they were originally assumed. This combination implies
that income inequality may bring different political implication at different levels
of economic development. Many studies ignored the importance of this joint effect
of income inequality and economic development on democratization, except Houle
(2016). Thus, my solution to the first weakness is to combine redistributive theory
and modernization theory, this will discuss the joint effect of income inequality and
economic development on the process to transitioning to democracy.
1.3.2 Political Liberalization before Democratization
The second problem of the existing research is the conceptualization of the progress
of democratization. I find that some studies treat democratization as a rapid regime
change when testing the relationship between their variable of interests and democ-
ratization, especially for the cases of third wave of democratization. However, the
transition to a democracy may sometimes require multiple political reforms in order
to become a democracy.
Therefore, I theorize that countries after the 1960s may experience the increased of
political liberalization before becoming democracy. Political liberalization is central
to the relationship between income inequality, economic development, and democra-
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tization, meaning that political liberalization helps countries to move to democracy.
What is new in my theory is that democratization in the third wave may not happen
within a short period because it relies on a constant interaction between different
actors, such as mass public and the autocratic government. Without increasing the
levels of liberalization at the first stage, it may not be easy for the opposition to pres-
sure the autocracy to become a democracy. In sum, the conditional effect of income
inequality and economic development does not always directly lead to democracy.
1.4 Two-Stage Process to Democracy
In order to provide an alternative theoretical framework to explain democratic tran-
sition, this dissertation proposes a model of two-stage process of democratization
to connect income inequality, economic development, political liberalization and de-
mocratization. In this model, countries may have experienced the increase of political
liberalization, with such important power in hand by the opposition, the likelihood
of becoming a democracy thus may increase significantly in the second stage.
1.4.1 First Stage: Income Inequality, Economic Development, and
Political Liberalizations
When and how does an autocratic country become more politically liberalized, such
as more free and fair elections and more civil rights? In this dissertation, I propose
that both income inequality and economic development are associated with a greater
political liberalization in the first stage. Most importantly, the effect of income in-
equality on political liberalization is conditional on levels of economic development.
Even though Miller (2012) points out that rich autocracies are less likely to democ-
ratize because rich autocracies have the ability to build and maintain a hierarchical
society, but not all rich autocracies are the same. For example, some rich autocracies
redistribute income relatively fairly, such as South Korea in the 1980s, while other
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rich autocracies may not do the same, such as current Singapore and Mexico in 1999.
It is not only rich autocracies that can develop hierarchical society, poor autocracies
can also develop hierarchical societies using their limited resources when income in-
equality is high. These differences, rich and poor, and low and high income inequality,
may bring about different consequences of democratization because income inequality
and economic development are associated with political liberalization.
For citizens, the primary goals or demands may include property right protection,
more economic opportunities, and income redistribution. However, citizens’ demands
may not all be the same in different autocratic regimes at different levels of income
inequality and economic development. That is, the interaction of income inequality
and economic development may influence the formation of the demands.
In the first stage of my model, citizens generally do not ask for immediate regime
transition, instead, they ask for more political powers and civil rights, such as more
voting rights, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and more, which could tem-
porarily meet their demands. An immediate regime transition means removing the
autocracy from the government immediately, which is an unacceptable option for the
autocracy. Once citizens achieved their primary goals, they may choose to slow down
their actions or temporarily suspend the demand for more political liberalization.
But it does not mean they will always stop after achieving the initial goals.
Once the initial demands had been fulfilled, the incentive and motivation to
protest may decrease. Citizens also acknowledge that more actions will put them
in danger. If they continue to ask for more political liberalization, then they may
face serious of punishment from the autocratic government. For the autocratic gov-
ernment, if they concede to grant more political powers to citizens after the country
became more politically liberalized, it will post higher risks of removing the autocracy
from the government. Therefore, they are less likely to choose to compromise with
the opposition again.
10
1.4.2 The Motivation of rebelling based on income inequality and
economic development
As mentioned above, citizens may look for property rights protection, more economic
opportunities, and income redistribution by having more political powers. So under
what conditions do citizens become more motivated to ask for opening up politics and
more civil liberties? Under what conditions does an autocracy agree to grant those
rights to citizens? Based on income inequality and economic development, I categorize
each of them into high and low levels, which creates a two by two combination as
shown in Table 1.1.
In rich autocracies
First of all, in a relatively rich autocracy, equal society is associated with higher
political liberalization. In this type of country, the wealth is distributed relatively
fairly, implying that citizens are equally rich. In general, economic development comes
with property rights protection. However, the autocratic government’s promise is not
always credible because they might still take away citizens’ property. Therefore,
citizens may prefer to have more access to the decision making process in order
to protect their property right from the confiscation from the autocratic government
Also, citizens in this type of country have more resources to fight against the autocracy
due to low income inequality and high income, which may give them more chances to
successfully ask for more political and civil rights and potential solve the collective
action problems.
Table 1.1: Classifying Countries Based on Income Inequality and Economic Development














On the other hand, when inequality is high in rich autocracies, citizens expect
property right protection for the limited wealth they have and income redistribution
from the rich. Due to high income inequality, citizens are facing a strong autocratic
government that most of the resources are controlled by this rich autocracy. Even
though citizens are also looking for being part of the decision making process, but a
strong autocratic government deters citizens from forming a strong opposition. The
autocratic government could choose to liberalize politics first, such as some non-
free-and-fair elections, to eliminate the intention of revolting if liberalization is less
costly. However, giving too much political rights increases the cost of repression,
the autocracy will stop liberalizing after the first few concessions to prevent the
formulation of stronger opposition. In this type of autocracy, government’s capacity
of repression always outweighs citizens’ capacity to revolt (Houle, 2016). For example,
the autocracy has the ability to build a hierarchical society to maintain their ruling
because citizens are more inclined to obey the hierarchy in order to receive more
economic opportunities (Miller, 2012; Solt, 2008).
In poor autocracies
In poor autocratic regimes, unequal society is associated with high political liberal-
ization. The society has only “limited” economic resources to be shared and they are
concentrated in the hands of the rich. Compared to rich autocracies, poor autocracies
are relatively difficult to build a hierarchical society to maintain their ruling because
the rich do not have enough resources to do it. For citizens in such poor and unequal
society, they acknowledge that high inequality put them into the worst situation.
Thus, they may ask the autocracy for income redistribution and more development,
which may be potentially helpful for them to change the current situation.
Lastly, poor and equal autocracies are associated with political liberalization.
The wealth is scarce and has already distributed fairly to citizens. There are no
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more resources to be redistributed from the rich. In this type of country, there
is no relationship between income inequality, economic development, and political
liberalization. Table 1.1 lays out the predictions of political liberalization and the level
of the hierarchy based on levels of income inequality and wealth. However, a gap is
still standing between political liberalization and democratization in the first stage. In
order to bridge this gap, I propose that autocracy’s ability to resist democratization
and mass public’s ability to organize are critical to this final step, meaning that
different types of political liberalization are associated with democratization.
1.5 Second Stage: Democratization with Political Liberalizations
After countries experienced more political liberalization at the first stage, the effect
of income inequality and economic development may continue to contribute to more
political liberalization, while political liberalization may also affect democratization.
Since democratization is a dynamic movement, countries with increasing high levels
of political liberalization are still moving toward democratization. At the second
stage, political liberalization becomes critical in associating with democratization.
This dissertation uses minimalist dichotomous measure of political regime to define
democratization. Both the executive and the legislature are popularly elected and
there must be more than one party competing in the elections (Cheibub, Gandhi and
Vreeland, 2010), which is closed to the assumptions of polyarchy that were proposed
by Dahl (1973). There are three aspects of political liberalization that may associate
with democratization, which include electoral, liberal, and participatory component
of democracy (Coppedge et al., 2019). All three components of democracy may
help citizens to better coordinate opposition movements and weaken the autocratic
government. Eventually, democratization becomes more likely.
When and why do citizens prefer democracy in the second stage when they have
more political and civil rights? First, with the experiences of living under semi-
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democratic rule, political liberalization may help citizens to develop a pro-democracy
attitude (Miller, 2012), which may breakdown the hierarchical society that was build
by autocracy when income inequality was high. It may essentially shift citizens’ sup-
port from an autocratic rule to a democratic rule. Second, high political liberalization
implies higher capacity for citizens to coordinate collective actions. It also implies
that repression becomes more costly for the autocratic government, at the mean time,
the cost of toleration goes down. Hence, citizens may have more incentive to revolt
and they have more ability to coordinate the movement. However, not every author-
itarian regime with high political liberalization can successfully become democracy.
For example, elections in autocratic regimes may also stabilize its rule (Lindberg,
2009), especially when income inequality is high.
This dissertation elaborates democratization theory by arguing that political lib-
eralization may increase at different levels of income inequality and economic devel-
opment. These conditions may help citizens to develop and shape pro-democracy
attitudes under autocratic rule through socialization, which may empower them to
organize. For the autocratic government, some of these conditions may raise the cost
of repression and weaken their ability to repress.
1.6 Plans of this Dissertation
Chapter 2 reviews existing work on the relationship between income inequality and
democratization, the relationship between economic development and democratiza-
tion, and other sources that may contribute to or inhibit democratization. I then
outline the theoretical mechanisms behind theories on democratization.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 provide the theoretical framework of the two-stage pro-
cess of democratization. It is a modified theory to explain democratization based by
incorporating redistributive conflict theory and modernization theory. It proposes
that political liberalization comes first and democratization may happen later. I out-
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line why both economic development and income inequality under autocracies may
change citizens’ preferences from status quo to a more politically liberalized gov-
ernment. I then detail the circumstances under which they may effectively increase
political liberalization and eventually exit dictatorship. Chapter 3 and 4 also outlines
how autocracies response to citizens’ demands and how they utilize semi-democratic
institutions to prevent democratization.
Chapter 5 discusses and justifies the strategy employed to analyze the relation
between income inequality, economic development, political liberalization and democ-
ratization. In particular, this chapter outlines the sources of the datasets because my
variables come from different research projects. I will also provide details of how and
why I use those variables.
Both Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 test many of my theory’s main empirical implica-
tions. I empirically model the democratic transition process by unpacking democra-
tization into two stages: the increase of political liberalization in the first stage by
looking at the effect of income inequality and economic development, and democra-
tization in the second stage by examining the effect of political liberalization.
Chapter 6 mainly presents the results of how the joint effect of income inequality
and economic development contribute to greater political liberalization. I find that
high income inequality is associated with high levels of political liberalization. Eco-
nomic development, which is measured by GDP per capita, is also associated with
high levels of political liberalization. However, the interaction of economic develop-
ment and income inequality has a negative effect on political liberalization, suggesting
that a rich and unequal autocracy does not increase political liberalization.
Chapter 7 tests how different types of political liberalization is associated with
democratization. There is an association between political liberalization and democ-
ratization but I demonstrate that not every type of political liberalization contributes
to a higher likelihood of democratization.
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Chapter 8 briefly summarizes findings of this dissertation and then outlines any
implication by the two-stage process of democratization. This chapter also discusses




Factors of Democratic Transition
This chapter discusses the literature of democratic transition. The first part of this
chapter focuses on the political economy approach, which discusses how economic
factors, such as economic development and income inequality, are associated with
democratization. Meanwhile, I will also discuss how scholars test these theories to
see if the evidences support them. The second part of this chapter discusses other
important factors that may contribute to democratization along with factors that
inhibit democracy. These theories includes political institutions and democratization,
cultural factors and democratization, and others.
2.1 Transition to Democracy
In the modern world, under what conditions, does democratic advancement becomes
more likely to happen? Why are some autocratic regimes established with char-
acteristics conducive to democratization while other autocratic regimes remain au-
thoritarian rules? The questions of the basic preconditions of democracy have been
debated for several decades. Regardless of the controversial debates, in the last few
decades, scholars of comparative democratization have gained fruitful findings by uti-
lizing different research methods: from large-N statistical investigations to in-depth
case studies, which had widened our knowledges on democratic transition.
Many scholars of comparative democratization examine how political economy
factors, such as economic development and income inequality, are associated with de-
mocratization. Take modernization theory. Modernization theorists have asserted the
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primacy or even the supremacy of socio-economic development on democratization.
Basically, they assert that the development of the economy transforms the structure
of the society, which will change citizens’ preference from autocratic rule to democ-
racy. While redistributive conflict theorists assume that the distribution of wealth in
the society is critical to citizens preferences on regime choices. Other than these two
economy related approaches, some scholars focus on political institutions, interna-
tional relations, culture, religion, ethnic diversity, and natural resources, to examine
whether these factors advance or hinder the prospects of democratic transition.
For democratization theories, many scholars have identified that some factors
hinder democratic transition, but we still have limited knowledges to figure out the
reason why democratization emerges, especially when we are trying to explain it by
using political economy approach. As of today, our understanding of democratization
is, however, far from completed. That is, the empirical studies have not yet to provide
solid evidences to support modernization theory and redistributive conflict theory.
2.2 Political Economy and Democratization: Economic
Development and Income inequality
Modernization theory and redistributive conflict theory are the two major democra-
tization theories that mainly focus on how economic related factors are associated
with democratization, where modernization theory focuses on the relationship be-
tween economic development and democratization, and redistributive conflict theory
discusses the relationship between income inequality and regime transition. Both
democratization theories provide clear theoretical frameworks, that they condensed
the path from authoritarian regime to democratic regime in order provide a better
picture to explain democratization. These two major theories have made contribu-
tions to the field of democratic transition. They continue to help scholars and policy
makers to understand how and why democracies emerged. However, the path from
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autocratic regimes toward democratic transition is far more complicated than the
theories scholars constructed.
The efforts of trying to find evidence to identify the relationship between economic
development/income inequality and democratization is great, but the inconsistent
empirical findings lead us to think about what factors are missing in both theo-
ries. For example, the foundational works by Boix and Stokes (2003) and Przeworski
et al. (2000) argued that economic development has little to no effect on democratic
transition for countries in the period of the post World War II. On the other hand,
more and more redistributive conflict scholars discussed the effect of income inequal-
ity on democratization by using both large-N and case studies. Their results are
also inconsistent, some of them found no relationship, or only a weak relationship,
between income inequality and democratization (Barro, 1999; Houle, 2009; Teorell,
2012), while some of them found negative (or positive) relations when interacting
with other factors (Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Boix, 2003; Freeman and Quinn, 2012).
Haggard and Kaufman (2012) have mixed finding, which shows that some countries
transitioned to democracy due to redistributive conflict, and some were led by elites.
2.3 Economic Development and Democratization
Recent research on the economic models of democratization has become more sophis-
ticated than decades ago due to the use of new datasets and new developed statistical
models. These empirical findings may all build on a primary research by Lipset (1959),
who observed a strong correlation between democracy and levels of economic devel-
opment. His foundational research started a debate over the relationship between
economic development and democratization. Before Lipset, most scholars used more
philosophical fashioned methods to study it, that is, Lipset’s research is perhaps the
first research that systematically investigate the relationship between economic de-
velopment and democracy. Since Lipset published his seminal work, more and more
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scholars started to conduct large-N studies, which have suggested various processes
of democratization through economic development related channels, such as educa-
tion and urbanization. Since citizens have acquired some knowledges and techniques,
therefore, these various channels will lead citizens to demand for democracy (e.g.,
Barro, 1999).
Recent research also confirmed what we thought we knew several decades ago:
richer countries are more likely to be democratic (Barro, 1999; Burkhart and Lewis-
Beck, 1994). The economic development explanation has been accepted to explaining
those newly democratized countries from 1970s to 1990s, which is marked as the third
wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991). Huntington (1991) agreed with the ar-
gument that economic development is not a determinative factor for democratization.
Instead, he proposed that middle income countries are more likely to become democ-
racy, such as South Korea and Taiwan. However, economic development still plays
an important mediating role that economic development provides a fertile land to
facilitate democratization and to destabilize autocratic rule.
In other words, much of this research assumes that citizens want democracy and
they can achieve democracy as they gained more power from economic development.
Based on modernization theory, Diamond (2012) even projected that most Asian
countries, including China, are more likely to become more liberalized or even a
democracy in a few decades. Asian countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia, and
China, are all have high chances to become more democratic in the next generation
(Diamond, 2012).1
1However, Larry Diamond overestimated the likelihood of democratization in these countries
when he referred to only one or two critical events. For example, he showed that the seats that
the oppositions had won in the 2011 election signaled a critical change for Singaporean government.
Actually, the incumbent party, the People’s Action Party, won over 94% of the seat and the opposi-
tion parties only gained less than 15% of the vote, which does not consider as a real victory for the
opposition. This is not enough to claim a bright future of democratization in Singapore. That is,
even though modernization theory assumes that citizens may want democracy when they are rich,
but we cannot forget that some people, such as the government, are reluctantly to give up their
powers.
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Controversy continues about whether economic development increases the likeli-
hood of transitions to democracy. The third wave of democratization provided more
cases for scholars to study democratic transition. But we still have little to under-
stand the relationship between economic development and democratization when we
are looking at empirical evidence. For example, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and
Przeworski et al. (2000) argue that there is no causal relationship between economic
development and democratization, that democratic transition can emerge for many
reasons. Przeworski et al. (2000)’s findings is a milestone for democratization theory
that pointed out that there are no systematic explanations to understand democratic
transition. When is economic development associated with democracy? Przeworski
et al. (2000) found that economic development is correlated with democratic consol-
idation. Rich democracies never returned to authoritarian regimes, which suggests
that economic development may stabilize a democratic regime. Przeworski et al.
(2000) also showed that no democracy has ever collapsed above a GDP per capita of
$6,055, Argentina’s level in 1975.
Scholars have a consensus that economic development does not “cause” democ-
ratization. Therefore, what we know about the relationship between economic de-
velopment and democratization is now more clear. However, other scholars started
to challenge Przeworski et al. (2000)’s argument. Boix and Stokes (2003) expanded
the dataset, which included countries between 1850 and 1950, and the results showed
that economic development is an important factor that contributes to democratiza-
tion prior to 1950. For countries in post-1950 period, however, economic development
still has only little effect on democratization, which is consistent with Przeworski et al.
(2000)’s findings. Other scholars like Epstein et al. (2006), found that development is
associate with democratization. This association happens especially when countries
transition from “partial democracy” to “full democracy,” but economic development
has less effects on transitions from “full autocracy” to “full democracy.”
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More and more scholars put efforts on investigating the relationship between eco-
nomic development and democratization, despite the widely accepted consensus that
development does not cause democracy. Most of them examined this relationship
by using a higher quality of datasets and new statistical models. Specifically, both
Miller (2012) and Treisman (2015) found that economic development has effect on
democratization when there is a regime instability or government weakness. When
there was a violent leader turnover, it helps citizens to perceive a message that the
the government can be weak and unstable to resist democratization(Londregan and
Poole, 1996; Miller, 2012).
Moreover, economic development can serve as a coordination signal for regime
opponents, meaning that this coordination signal helps opponents to solve collective
action problems (Miller, 2012). Treisman (2015) further suggests that economic devel-
opment is associated with more democratic politics in the medium run and only after
an incumbent autocrat leaves office. In the short run, since the government benefits
from economic growth, a rapid economic growth may increase autocrats’ chance of
survival. Later in Treisman (2019)’s article, he proposed a conditional modernization
theory to identify some certain conditions along with development that may promote
democracy. He showed that economic crises, military defeats, or leader change are
associated with democratization.
Based on what scholars have done, we may conclude that economic development is
still correlated with democratization, but the relationship continues to remain vague.
This also leads scholars to optimistically assume that some developing countries have
the potential to become democracy. As I have discussed above, based on moderniza-
tion theory, Diamond (2012) claims that a wave of democratization will likely turn
most East Asian countries to democracies within a generation. However, as of today,
we still can see the importance of economic development on democratization under
different circumstances.
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2.4 Income Inequality and Democratization
Redistributive conflict theory moves away from focusing on how rich the society is
to the fairness of the distribution of wealth in society. Specifically, this school of
theory also considers elites’ incentives to deny democratization and models democ-
ratization as a strategic interaction between rich elites and poor citizens (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003; Haggard and Kaufman, 2012). Specifically, they see
authoritarian rule as a means of sustaining income inequality between classes.
For poor citizens in an unequal society, they become the median voter and they
prefer high taxes in order to redistribute wealth from the rich. The more unequal the
wealth distribution, the more confiscatory the tax rate can be expected. However,
the rich have strong incentive to defend their property and political rights by using
repression when income is highly concentrated. Hence, the rich do not always agree
with new tax rate, unless there is a “credible” violence or revolution. The reason
for poor citizens to get together and ask for political reform is because democracy,
as an institution, ensures more income redistribution and more assets protection,
which is available to every citizen (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). For redistributive
conflict theory, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) both made great con-
tributions to explaining the relationship between income inequality and democratic
transition. They both argue that elites’ fear for redistribution is critical to democra-
tization, they both theorized that rich elites fear less when the wealth is distributed
relatively fairly because median voter’s preference with regard to taxes will then be
less confiscatory.
Boix (2003) expects a linear relationship between income inequality and the likeli-
hood of democratization. This means that society with low income inequality is more
likely to democratize because it reduces the expected redistribution under democratic
government. With lower levels of income inequality, elites have fewer incentives to
resist democracy as the costs of redistribution are lower.
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Besides income inequality, Boix (2003) also argued that high levels of capital
mobility, as well as “asset specificity,” are associated with democratization. “Asset
specificity” is a concept to describe the degree of the mobility of moving out wealth
to other countries. In autocracies with high levels of capital mobility, rich elites have
an exit option to move their capital to other places in order to avoid confiscatory tax
rate. Since rich elites can move their assets more freely, they tend to fear democracy
less. Instead of setting a high confiscatory tax rate, the poor citizens, who is the
median voter, will set a rather moderate tax rate in order to benefit from wealth
redistribution after the rich moved out. Therefore, this type of authoritarian regime
has high chances to become democracy.
For Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), their model’s basic assumption is similar to
Boix (2003)’s, that the society is divided into rich and poor, but their prediction for
democratization is different. In theory, democratic transition becomes less likely in
authoritarian regimes when income inequality is too high. This is because the rich
fear high cost of new tax rate that will confiscate their property after the transition,
so they will choose to suppress democracy movement. When income inequality is
high, it means more redistribution will occur when the rich consent, but do not want
to lose all of their interests after democratization. In low income inequality countries,
democratization is less likely to occur because there is no demand from citizens.
Without the demand of redistribution from the poor, the rich can continue to stay in
power without facing serious challenges from the poor.
For countries with intermediate levels of income inequality, poor citizens are more
likely to rebel and ask for more redistribution. From rich elites’ point of view, they
tend not to use repression because it is relatively costly. Thus, at intermediate levels
of inequality, the masses are willing to protest and the elites are unwilling to repress,
which means democracy is more likely to happen. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005)
say: “[the masses can] challenge the system, create significant social unrest and tur-
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bulence, or even pose a serious revolutionary threat (25).” Rich elites can certainly
offer temporal income redistribution, but redistribution is not credible to the poor
under autocracy. To the poor, democracy is a credible political institution that offers
redistribution not only in the present but also in the future. If the rich refuse to grant
democracy, the poor can continue to threaten with revolution. The elites certainly do
not want revolution, they will lose their economic interests a lot in democracy after
revolution. Under this circumstance, the elites will also provide democratic institu-
tion as a credible commitment to promise more equal redistribution not only in the
present but in the future as well.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) also introduce recessions to their model, which
conditions the effect of income inequality on democratization. Recessions can be
divided in to intensity recessions and frequent recessions. If a country is encoutering
frequent recessions, the poor has to threaten the rich by revolution more often. This
gives the autocracy an opportunity to offer credible redistribution without having
democracy, which will eventually stabilize authoritarian rule. Hence, Acemoglu and
Robinson (2005)’s model suggests an inverted-U relationship of democratization: at
low levels of income inequality, an increase can promote democracy by increasing the
threat of revolution, but at higher levels of income inequality, rich elites will choose
repression rather than offering concessions. Rich elites fear of redistribution after
democratization when income inequality is high.
In sum, according to Boix (2003), democratization happens at low levels of in-
equality and high levels of capital mobility because rich elite’s do not fear redistribu-
tion. On the other hand, Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argued that democracy only
occurs at an intermediate level of inequality, rich elites are afraid of high tax rate after
revolution. Both researches used a similar assumption to lay out the conflicts between
poor citizens and rich elites, even though the expectations on the likelihood of democ-
ratization are different, but their theories help us understand how democratization
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emerged. Boix (2003)’s showed empirical evidences for the effect of income inequality,
but Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) did not present such empirical findings.
However, other empirical evidences on the relationship between income inequal-
ity, distributive conflict and democratization are always inconclusive (Ahlquist and
Wibbels, 2012; Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Haggard and Kaufman, 2016a). (Houle,
2009) found that democratic consolidation is associated with income inequality, but
his evidence did not show association between income inequality and democratiza-
tion. Does income inequality and economic development really have no effect at
all? Previous empirical studies show a pessimistic view on their effects on the future
of democracy. In society with high income inequality, citizens learn to respect the
authority and makes the society more hierarchical (Solt, 2012). Citizens also have
less interests to be engaged in political affairs because they heavily rely on the rich
for economic opportunity, such as jobs, when income inequality is high (Solt, 2008).
These studies imply that income inequality may harm democracy.
Some studies try to investigate if there is a conditional effect on the effect of
inequality on democratization, which provides a more in-depth discussion on how in-
come inequality promotes democratization . For example, Ansell and Samuels (2014)
focused on conflicts between agricultural elites and rising commercial classes. They
found that the effect of income inequality on democratization is negatively associated
with concentration of ownership in land. This means that autocracies with unequal
land distribution are less likely to democratize. But if the inequality came from the
rise of new social classes due to commercialization, then autocracies are more likely to
democratize. More specifically, highly unequal countries with more industry sectors
are more likely to become democracy. Meanwhile, Freeman and Quinn (2012) also
find that financial integration autocracies, especially those with high levels of inequal-
ity, are more likely to democratize than unequal financially closed autocracies.
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2.5 More about Autocratic Regime Stability or Instability in
Political Economy Models
As noted above, empirical studies show no consistent result for modernization theory
and redistributive conflict theory. Instead, many studies have the consensus that
both income inequality and economic development are regime-strengthening forces.
If economic development could be a factor to promote democratization (Kennedy,
2010), it could also be an impediment to democratization. Many scholars suggest
that economic development can stabilize both democratic regimes and authoritarian
regimes (Haggard and Kaufman, 2016b; Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). For example,
in democracy, citizens reward the incumbent for good economic performance of the
country by voting for the incumbent in the following election (Fiorina, 1978; Kiewiet,
2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000).
In authoritarian regimes, economic development may have a positive effect on
regime stability because it helps building the state’s repressive capacity (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003; Houle, 2016). Economic development also raises the opportunity cost for
political instability, meaning that the cost to oppose the government is much higher
in rich authoritarian regimes for citizens (Przeworski, 2005). Thus, citizens become
less inclined to use violence and they have less ability to organize mass mobilizations
(Feng, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005).
On the other hand, high income inequality is also a regime-strengthening force
for autocratic regimes. Both Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Boix (2003) sug-
gest that high income inequality hurts democratization, which is supported by Houle
(2016)’s empirical finding. Solt (2012) suggests that greater income inequality stabi-
lizes autocratic rule because it shapes citizens’ feelings toward the authority. Specif-
ically, income inequality helps the society to develop a hierarchical structure, which
leads the poor to obey the authority more. Hence, democratization becomes less
likely when income inequality is high.
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2.6 Political Institutions and Democratization
Besides political economy explanations, Geddes (1999) focused on how different types
of authoritarian regimes are associated with democratization. For the authoritarian
regimes after World War II, the leaderships, institutional designs, the relationship
with supporters and oppositions may lead them to breakdown differently (Geddes,
1999). This helps us to explain why the post-1950 democratizations have such differ-
ent forms from those before 1950 (Boix and Stokes, 2003).
In Geddes (1999)’s seminal work, authoritarian regimes can be classified into
three different types based on different leaderships: professionalized military regime,
hegemonic party regime, and personalistic regime. This argument is built on the
suggestions by Przeworski (1991a)’s that military regimes are more likely to fail than
other types of authoritarian regimes. Geddes (1999) goes further to theorize that
military regimes are more easily to fail during economic crisis, which leads to doubt
of efficacy of military rule. O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) also suggest
that military rulers usually started with negotiation before returning to military,
which leads democracy to become more likely than overthrowing the government
violently. Thus the collapse of a military regime is usually more likely to result in a
democracy.
On the contrary, hegemonic party regimes have higher survival rate than pro-
fessionalized military regimes Geddes (1999, 2003). For hegemonic party regimes,
they are more flexible in dealing with crises and challenges. For the members of the
party, they will prefer to be replaced by democracy if they cannot maintain their
power. Democracy gives those members an opportunity to continue their political
careers in the competitive elections. Eventually, these elections result in the exit of
the hegemonic party regime.
For regimes that controlled by one powerful leader, they are more likely to be
replaced by another dictatorship than democracy (Geddes, 1999). Compared to hege-
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monic party regime and professionalized military regime, leader of personalist regime
is less wiling to negotiate their exit from office with the oppositions because the
threats they are facing are mostly unfavorable, such as assassinations, confiscation,
or exile. Therefore, popular protests and demonstrations that initiated by outside
opposition groups may lead the regime to consider implementing multiparty elections,
which can be found in African countries (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Mattes
and Bratton, 2007). Also, they are more likely to be overthrown in revolution and
civil wars (Geddes, 2003).
Geddes (1999) discusses regime transition based on different types of authoritarian
regimes, which provides different aspects to think about democratization. Knutsen,
Nygård and Wig (2017) and Lindberg (2009) address the importance of the elections
in authoritarian regimes. Several studies have pointed out that elections and electoral
institutions could eliminate the threat from the oppositions to the regime (Gandhi,
2008), by splitting the opposition, enhancing legitimacy, strengthening party orga-
nization, and buying time for later exit (Knutsen, Nygård and Wig, 2017). But
Knutsen, Nygård and Wig (2017) propose that elections could produce short-term
instability in autocratic regime, therefore, in the long run, elections stabilize auto-
cratic regimes.
It seems to us that democratic institutions, such as electoral institution, in au-
thoritarian regimes are harmful to the likelihood of democratic transition. Lindberg
(2009) proposes that even though elections in authoritarian regimes may not be free
and fair, but it at least is the key of democratization in the early stage. Elections in
authoritarian regimes raise the cost of repression and decrease the cost of toleration,
especially when the general public and the opposition expect to see a more demo-
cratic freedom. That is, democratization becomes more likely. Therefore, Lindberg
(2009) sees democratization as a gradual process that a regime becomes increasingly
democratic.
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2.7 Other Factors that May Resist Democracy: Culture, Natural
Resources, and Income Inequality
The above discussed factors that are associated with democratization, but some other
factors may explain why democratization does not happen. From the cultural per-
spectives, Confucian society is considered as an impediment to democratization. In a
Confucian society, people developed a more hierarchical attitude toward the author-
ity. People learn a greater respect for authority from their hierarchical social context.
Therefore, the authoritarianism is more widespread and the living experiences in a
Confucian society make democratization harder to be achieved (Hsieh, 2003).
In Karatnycky (2002)’s work, he concluded that Islam culture’s traditional values
contribute to a strong association between Islam society and authoritarianism. (Fish,
2002) disagrees this claim by saying that the suppression of women’s rights in these
countries is critical to democratization. That is, the treatment of women in muslim
societies hinders democratization. Later in Ross (2008)’s seminal work, he provides
a different view to explain why women’s right in Islamic society has always been
violated, which is correlated with the impediment to democratization. Many scholars
claim that a bad treatment of women always happens in muslim society, but Ross
(2008) found that oil production explains why women’s status is low in Muslim society,
it is because oil production reduces the number of women in the work force, which
declines women’s influences in every perspective.
Some scholars focus on the relationship between oil production and democratiza-
tion, such as Crystal (1995). They always find that oil wealth does not contribute
to democracy, instead, it stabilizes dictatorship (Ross, 2001). The so-called resource
curse happens in countries with wealth in oil and other minerals. For this type of
country, the autocratic government usually used the sale of natural resources to dis-
tribute subsidies to citizens, which maintain a strong popular support for the regime
(Anderson, 1987).
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However, not all oil rich countries are the same. Herb (2005) also showed that
if oil productions and sales are not the main contribution to the economy, there is
a positive correlation between economic development and the changes of democracy
scores. Kurtz and Brooks (2011) also found some resource-rich countries that have
successfully diversified the economy, this resource curse pose no threat on democracy.
Moreover, Dunning (2008) argued that oil rents can sustain democracy when the
wealth is distributed. Therefore, oil production may be a curse to democracy, but it
only happens to countries that only rely on oil as the main economic activity.
Above all in this subsection, scholars have identified some factors that are nega-
tively associated with democracy. However, we always can find some specific condi-
tions that countries with such factors still transitioned to democracy. For example,
South Korea and Taiwan are both Confucian societies and both have transitioned
to democracies. Indonesia and Turkey both have large Muslim populations, both
countries have experienced democratization as well. As previous empirical studies
signaled, there are some specific conditions to connect income inequality and de-
mocratization and economic development and democratization, which provides more
information about when democratization is more likely to occur. However, most of
these studies discuss the effect of income inequality and the effect of the economic
development separately. This largely ignores that income inequality actually means
differently in countries with different levels of economic development (Houle, 2016).
2.8 Conclusion
Despite the findings of no causal relationship between economic development and
democratization by Przeworski et al. (2000), recent empirical studies on democrati-
zation have confirmed the relationship between economic development and democracy
when some specific conditions occur. Moreover, there are lots of disagreements on
how democracy emerges, which I have discussed in the previous sections. It seems
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to us that the emergence of democracy does not always only rely on just one path
(Haggard and Kaufman, 2016a,b), most of the theories on democratization seem to
be plausible in explaining democratic transition, even though these explanations for
these correlations remain contested.
In the next chapter, I scrutiny discussed the weakness, problems and unanswered
questions of the literature I reviewed in this chapter. Based on my criticisms, I
construct my theory to explain democratization in the third wave democratization
period. Specifically, in my dissertation, I bring economic development back to the dis-
cussion on democratization along with the effect of income inequality. I then propose
that levels of political liberalization increased by liberalizing politics when income
inequality and economic development meet at different conditions. Later, countries
that with the help of the increased of levels of political liberalization, autocracies thus
become more likely to transition to democracies. This path to democracy can be one
of the explanations to understand democratization.
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Chapter 3
An Alternative Way to Explain the path
toward Democratization
Democratization is a rare event, many scholars are striving to discover the main
causes of democratization as it is a major change to political institutions and political
regimes. This change will bring significant differences to citizens who are living in
transitional regimes (Huntington, 1991; Diamond, 1999). On one hand, many studies
identified the impediment to democratization, such as natural resources and Islamic
culture; On the other hand, the effect of political economy on democratization still
remains ambiguous.
As I discussed in the last chapter, the empirical evidence on relationships between
income inequality and democratization, as well as the relationship between economic
development and democratization, are not as clear as redistributive conflict theory
and modernization theory suggested. However, under some certain circumstances,
income inequality and economic development may associated with democratization,
which implies that both theories may contribute to democratization.
In this chapter, I will discuss how I speculate my theory to explain the progress of
democratization and point out the weaknesses of political economy theory on democ-
ratization. After reviewing most of the literature on democratization, I found only
a few of them discussed the conditional effect of economic development on the rela-
tionship between income inequality and democratization (e.g. Houle, 2016). I expect
to observe different outcomes of regime transition when effect of economic develop-
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ment comes into play. Meanwhile, most literature treated democratization as a fast
developing movement when testing the effects of different factors on democratization,
which may be the reason why scholars find inconclusive findings for its effect. In most
cases, democratization should not always be a movement that happened in a short
period, instead, it is a slow progressing movement.
3.1 First Issue: The meaning of income inequality
What does income inequality look like for countries that experienced democratization
between 1960 and 2010? Did most of these countries transitioned to democracy when
income inequality was high? In Figure 3.1, I plot the Gini index for each country
that had experienced democratic transition between 1960 and 2010. In this figure,
the y-axis is the value of the Gini index, this Gini index comes from Standardized
World Income Inequality Dataset (SWIID) (Solt, 2016). While the x-axis is each
country that has democratization, this information is provided by “Democracy and
Dictatorship” (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010).
Figure 3.1 shows that some countries with low income inequality democratized
and some countries with high income inequality also democratized. Haggard and
Kaufman (2012) may be correct that not every country transitioned to democracy
based on the conflict between the rich and the poor. However, it does not necessarily
mean that income inequality was completely unrelated with democratization in these
countries. Based on Figure 3.1, I do not have sufficient information to identify the
relationship between income inequality and democratization, but this figure moti-
vates me to discuss why both high and low income inequality countries can become
democracies.
What have previous studies missed? I propose that most of the literature may mis-
conceptualize the meaning of income inequality, which may lead to mis-interpretations









Figure 3.1: Gini Coefficient for Each Country between 1960 and 2010
look at income inequality indicators, such as the Gini index of income inequality,
scholars usually classify income inequality indicators into high income inequality,
medium income inequality, and low income inequality (e.g. Houle, 2016). There is no
problem with classifying income inequality like this, however, many scholars do not
notice that income inequality means different things at different levels of economic
development, which may lead to different results of democratization.
But why is economic development important to help us to understand the re-
lationship between income inequality and democratization? As mentioned, income
inequality means different things at different levels of economic development, there-
fore, the resources that are expected to be redistributed may be different at different
levels of economic development (Houle, 2016; Miller, 2012; Slater, Smith and Nair,
2014). Table 3.1 lays out four types of countries based on different levels of income
inequality and different levels of economic development. It helps us to identify why
income inequality means different things under different levels of economic develop-
ment. For example, low income inequality in poor country means citizens are, not
completely, equally poor, such as Pakistan in 2013 and Nepal in 2010. On the other
hand, low income inequality in rich country means citizens are equally rich, such as
Sweden in 2010.
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Unequal society can also mean different things in rich and poor countries. Since
levels of economic development imply how much the society owns, this may condi-
tion the incentive for the disenfranchised citizens to ask for redistributions and the
incentive for the autocracy to make changes. When citizens ask for more political
and civil rights, the leaders of the autocratic government may use several strategies,
such as repression or cooptation, to respond to the discontents. However, different
autocracies have different capabilities to deal with it.
Scholars always assume the leaders of autocracy are the same, indeed, they ac-
tually tend to have different institutional structures and different relationships with
their supporters and ordinary citizens (Geddes, 1999; Geddes, Wright and Frantz,
2014; Bechtel, Hangartner and Schmid, 2016). For example, Geddes, Wright and
Frantz (2014) classified autocratic regimes into personalist, military, and party. Au-
tocratic regimes can also have different levels of political liberalization. For example,
Polity IV dataset classified autocratic regimes into different subtypes based on the
levels of democracy for each autocracy. Therefore, different types of autocracy under
different economic development may respond to mass protest due to income inequal-
ity.
If we attempt to discuss the relationship between income inequality and democra-
tization, therefore, adding economic development as the conditional effect on income
inequality could provide a better picture to understand democratization. The effect of
income inequality on democratization may vary due to the heterogeneity of economic
development across autocracies.
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3.1.1 Bringing economic development back
Based on Figure 3.1, in Figure 3.2, I add GDP per capita as the measure of the
economy. This dataset comes from the Penn World Table, I plot countries that had
experienced democratization from 1960 to 2010 based on levels of the economy and
income inequality in the year of the transition. According to Figure 3.2, it does not
show a clear pattern of the relationship between income inequality and democratiza-
tion, nor a linear relationship between GDP per capita and democratization. It shows
that some “poor” and “unequal” countries, such as Malawi and Burundi, transitioned
to democracy; while some “middle income” and “unequal” countries, such as South
Africa and Brazil, also democratized. To be more specific, Figure 3.2 also shows
that, during the year of transitioning to democracy, country’s income inequality can
range from low income inequality (Gini coefficient<25) to high income inequality
(Gini coefficient>50), and most of the countries’ income inequality were in the range



























































































Figure 3.2: Levels of income inequality and economic development
Meanwhile, Figure 3.3 shows that, in 2010, many autocracies did not become a
democracy even though they have reached some certain levels of income inequality
and economy development. Meanwhile, there were some relatively rich countries that
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still remained under autocratic rule. If both redistributive theory and modernization




































































Figure 3.3: Levels of income inequality and economic development for autocracies in 2010
The democratic transition cases show that neither redistribution theory nor mod-
ernization theory can independently explain democratization. In order to get a better
picture to understand democratization, it is important if we can discuss the condi-
tional effect of economic development on the effect of income inequality on democ-
ratization. I argue that income inequality and the economy are the foundations of
citizens’ willingness to participate in anti-government activities and also government’s
response to those activities. Again, a similar level of income inequality can be different
meaning at different levels of economic development.
Houle (2016)’s research on democratization was the first research that discussed
the effect of income inequality on democratization that is actually conditional on the
level of economic development. He finds that income inequality is associated with
democratization only at intermediate levels of economic development; and income in-
equality harms democratization in rich autocracies. Houle (2016) uses state capacity
to explain the relationship between income inequality and democratization. But state
capacity is highly correlated with levels of economic development, that means Houle
did not explain well why economic development can condition the effect of income
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inequality on democratization. That is, Houle only discussed how conditional effect
affect government’s ability to respond mass protests, but did not discuss how this
conditional effect help citizens to coordinate mass protests.
3.2 Second Issue: The Meaning of Democracy and Democratization
The second issue involves theoretical and empirical perspective that may lead to in-
conclusive findings in literature. On the theoretical perspective, many studies used
dichotomous measure of democracy to test the relationship between income inequal-
ity/economic development on democratization (Houle, 2016), which implies that de-
mocratization is an immediate regime change as most studies because everything
remained unchanged before transition. A binary coding of democratization may
make it difficult to observe the effect of income inequality and economic develop-
ment. To be more specific, it is difficult to observe the effect of income inequality
and the economy on democratic transition before the country becomes a democracy.
The binary codings for the democratization variable in the dataset remain zero be-
fore country’s democratic transition. This may largely ignore that democratization
is dynamic movement, which could last years and may be an on going process until
a non-democracy transitioned to a democracy. If scholars connect the relationship
between income inequality and a binary coding of democratization, it may lose a lot
of information about the effect of income inequality before country transitioned to
a democracy. That is, the year of transitioning to a full democracy is only the final
result of this long process.1
As mentioned, democratization is a dynamic process. Immediate democratic tran-
sition is rare, such as Panama in 1989, and it is rare for the effect of income inequality
and economic development to flip an authoritarian regime to a democracy in a short
1Please note that not every study on democratization uses binary coding of democracy to do
empirical testing. For example, Freeman and Quinn (2012) uses PolityIV index.
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period. The effect income inequality and economic development on democratization
may “accumulate” slowly. In this dissertation, I propose that income inequality and
economic development are the fundamentals of democratic transition, but they do
not directly lead to democratic transition, instead, this jointly effect lead the dis-
enfranchised citizens to move the first step toward asking for more political powers,
i.e. political liberalization. Political liberalization is critical to democratization after
income inequality and economic development trigger the increase of political liberal-
ization. The role of political liberalization before democratization has been largely
ignored by scholars of third wave of democratization.
In today’s world, many autocracies possess institutions that use the name of
democratic principles. For example, Singapore and Malaysia both have multi-party
elections for the parliaments, and all eligible citizens can cast their votes without much
interference. Even though a lot of autocracies run their governments in the name
of democracy, but they usually violate at least one or more democratic principles,
which actually represents the idea of non-democracy. In Singapore, the government
sets up rules to obstruct opposition parties ability to compete with the incumbent
party, which largely impacts opposition parties’ chances of winning a parliament seat.
Meanwhile, it also decreases citizens’ willingness to vote for opposition parties. That
is, even though the government of Singapore allows oppositions to run elections and
also allows all eligible voters to vote, we still cannot classify Singapore as a full
democracy.2 Thus, many of the datasets categorized Singapore as partial democracy,
partly free country, or non-democracy, such as Freedom House, Polity IV.
The use of partial democracy or partly free country may be misleading. This type
of country is essentially not democracy, based on the polyarchy principles (Dahl,
1973). We see many of studies use binary coding of democracy (e.g., Haggard and
2Besides violating the electoral principles, civil liberties are also harmed by the autocratic rule
(Levitsky and Way, 2010).
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Kaufman, 2012, 2016b; Houle, 2009, 2016). By using this binary measurement to
capture the concept of democratization is reasonable at the first glance, because de-
mocratization, by definition, is a regime that transitions from a non-democracy to a
democracy. This measurement indicates that a new democracy completed “all the
essential processes and elements” of democratization, such as high levels of polit-
ical participation and high levels of political contestation. This means that some
of the countries achieved high levels of political liberalization before their achieved
democratic transition.
Before a country transitions to a democracy, a binary indicator is coded the coun-
try as zero because there was no democratic transition (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vree-
land, 2010). Even though the dataset coded a “no transition” as a zero sincerely
reflects the condition of democratization for individual country, but a binary indi-
cator of democratization ignores that many political development may occur in au-
tocracies before the transition. Haggard, Webb et al. (1994) and Huntington (1991)
discuss that many transitions started from some forms of oligarchic government to
democratic government by increasing suffrage and competitions. This also shows
that before transitioning to a democracy, autocratic government may increase levels
of political liberalization and this could eventually help the country to move to the
final step to a democracy.
Meanwhile, different types of autocracy, based on the “levels of democracy,” may
generate different outcomes of democratization. For example, Epstein et al. (2006)
find that transition from “partial democracy” to full democracy is highly associated
with economic development, but economic development has less effects on transitions
from full autocracy to full democracy. This study shows the importance of political
liberalization before transition.
As mentioned previously, many autocracies could introduce some democratic in-
stitutions into the government, such as elections or semi-legislative branches, “feature
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arenas of contestation in which opposition forces can challenge, and even oust, au-
thoritarian incumbents” (Levitsky and Way, 2010). That is, even autocracies could
allow some certain levels of civil liberties or elections, due to variety of motivations.
The autocracy sometimes offers incremental democratic rules as the promises to the
citizens that they can ensure to provide more public goods and good policies in the
future (North and Weingast, 1989; Weingast, 1997). Empowering the citizens could
stabilize autocratic rule, but this incremental power sharing may be critical to the
final transition to democracy, that is, without having some levels of “competition”
and “inclusiveness” in hand, transition to a democracy becomes a difficult task.
3.2.1 political liberalization and democratization
Democratic transition in Taiwan is a prime example to demonstrate this slow incre-
mental process. Before the transition, citizens in Taiwan had already gained voting
rights, but the competition between the autocratic government and others was still
very limited. Even though Taiwan citizens could vote under KMT’s autocratic rule,
the fairness was largely eroded by the KMT government. This included vote buying
and different forms of electoral fraud, which ensured that KMT candidates would win.
Meanwhile, the KMT government also banned the formation of new political parties
until 1986 (Cheng, 1989; Cheng, Haggard and Kang, 1998). After the Martial Law
was lifted in 1987, it opened up not just political rights, such as forming new parties,
but also civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and freedom of press. However,
Taiwan did not achieve to democracy immediately in 1987, most scholars consider
the year 1996 as the year of transition.3
Taiwan slowly increased levels political liberalization since late 1960 because there
were both “national” and local elections. During the period between lifting the Mar-
3Taiwan had the first popular elected president in 1996. Others consider 2000 was the year of
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(b) Participatory component
Figure 3.4: Electoral component and participatory component for Taiwan and South
Korea before democratization, source: V-dem dataset
tial Law in 1987 and the first presidential election in 1996, Taiwan actually had
increased more levels of electoral component and participatory component of democ-
racy in each year (see Figure 3.4). Not only Taiwan, many countries also experienced
such similar process of democratization after 1960. Figure 3.4 also plots levels of
electoral component and participatory component of democracy before South Ko-
rea’s democratic transition in 1987, it was true that South Korea also increased its
levels of political liberalization.
In sum, a binary indicator of democratization does not capture the dynamic of the
process of democratic transition, even though it captures the concept of a democracy.
It assumes that nothing has happened before transitioning to a democracy regardless
that countries were actually increased the levels of liberalization. It makes the effect
of income inequality on democratization hard to observe.
3.3 Why Political Liberalization is important to democratization
We may be able to observe a relationship between income inequality and the tran-
sition to democracy, but the effect of income inequality is associated with political
liberalization in the first place. If a country can garner some certain levels of liberal-
ization in the first place, it may make the country more easy to become a democracy.
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Autocracies may choose to open up part of political inclusiveness and competitive-
ness slowly, such as expanding voting rights or allowing opposition parties. Income
inequality could be a trigger for citizens to ask for more political powers.4 For ex-
ample, as mentioned in Figure 3.3, most scholars mark 1996 as the year of Taiwan’s
transition to democracy because of the first popular vote presidential election was
held in that year. Using this binary classification to discuss the effect of income in-
equality assumes that the effect of income inequality was uncorrelated to Taiwan’s
transition years before 1996. But Taiwan actually started to launch political re-
forms in 1987 and started to expand political rights and civil liberties. From 1987
to 1996, Taiwanese gained the “semi-democratic” experiences and learned from it.
With having this prior “semi-democratic” experience, it will help citizens to develop
anti-authoritarian attitude and potentially can weaken the autocratic government.
That is, first, autocracies may be more likely to be undermined by high liberaliza-
tion. Second, high liberalization motivates citizens to ask for more political powers.
Thus, I propose that the effect of income inequality is associated with the increase (or
decrease) the level of liberalization, but it is conditional on economic development,
which will correlate with democratization.
Haggard and Kaufman (2016b)’s research implies that a new democratic transi-
tion may not experience some types of political liberalization before moving toward
a full democracy. In their studies, Haggard and Kaufman scrutinize the causal mech-
anisms underpinning distributive conflict models of democratization across all cases
of democratic transition between 1980 and 2008. They find that only around half of
transitions and a third of reversions can be characterized as being driven in some way
by distributive conflict. The remaining cases of transition are those led by elites. It
is worth to note that, when evaluating each case of democratization, they only eval-
4There are some examples that countries did not experience the increase of political liberalization
before transitioning to democracy. Such as post-colonial countries, Japan in 1950s and Panama in
1989
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uate if there was a redistributive conflict during the year of transition, and then they
make conclusions based this limited observation. There are some possibilities that
distributive conflicts may happen before the year of transition, and those distributive
conflict may result in the increase of political liberalization.
In most cases, the process to democratization were led by the public due to income
inequality or economic development (Miller, 2012; Treisman, 2015). By slowly asking
for more political powers from the government, eventually an autocracy will become
more likely to transition to a democracy once citizens decide to have democracy.
Epstein et al. (2006) has done similar approach to study the relationship between
development and democratization. By using trichotomous measure of democracy,
their result shows that development is associated with democratization from partial
democracy to full democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) also mention that
autocracy sometimes releases political powers to the poor in order to appease poor
people’s discontents due to rising income inequality. This implies that non-democratic
countries are not all the same and can be categorized into different types (Geddes,
1999, 2003; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). Meanwhile, the levels of liberalization
can vary across different countries, which could range from no political liberalization
to high levels of political liberalization. At this point, income inequality may be a
good predictor of weakening the authoritarian regimes due to the increase of political
liberalization, which were largely ignored by previous empirical studies.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I lay out two significant issues that may bring the inconclusive findings
of the relationship between income inequality and democratization. First, economic
development should play an important mediating role on the effect of income in-
equality on democratization. Second, democratization should be treated as a slow
progressing movement when discussing effects of income inequality and economic de-
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velopment on democratization. Therefore, I propose that the jointly effect of income
inequality and economic development does not directly lead to immediate democratic
transition, instead, it is associated with political liberalization. In the end, high levels
of political liberalization contributes to democratization.
In the next chapter, I will discuss how to connect income inequality and democ-
ratization by introducing economic development and political liberalization. First, I
will discuss how income inequality and economic development promote the increase
of political liberalization. Second, I will discuss how different types of political liber-




In the last chapter, I argue that democratization is a slow progressing movement,
which may increase levels of political liberalization gradually. Also, the effect of
income inequality on this slow progressing movement is conditional on levels of eco-
nomic development. In this chapter, I offer a two-stage process of democratization.
This model focuses on the mechanisms between income inequality and political lib-
eralizations under the conditional effect of economic development in the first stage,
and the effect of political liberalization on democratization in the second stage.
4.1 Democratization is not (always) an urgent demand
Based on a minimalist dichotomous measure of democracy, both the executive and
the legislature must be popularly elected and there must be more than one party
competing in the elections (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010). Besides, civil
liberty must be extended to a higher level in democracy. Asking for immediate
democratization may post an immediate threat to the autocratic government. This
is because the leaders of the autocracy government could potentially be removed by
the new democratic government and could potentially facing a series of trials after
democratization. Since the goal for an autocracy is to stay in power as long as
they can (Svolik, 2012), therefore, asking for “immediate democratization” will bring
punishments to the oppositions.1
1Most of the autocratic political parties stepped down after democratization due to free and fair
elections (Huntington, 1991).
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For citizens, their demands may be more redistributive policies or property rights
protection, that asking for more political powers may be helpful. These demands do
not require immediate democratization to be achieved. The autocratic government
could implement a temporal or long term policy in order to appeal oppositions and
alleviate the discontented citizens. For example, according to Miller (2015), electoral
authoritarian regimes can provide good social policies and health policies. Moreover,
electoral authoritarian regimes can include oppositions into their decision making
process, which means a higher level of political liberalization (Levitsky and Way,
2010). Under this circumstance, when an autocracy responds by providing good
policies to citizens or incorporating oppositions into the decision making processes,
then some citizens may feel that the need for more democracy decreases because
citizens demands had been met. 2 But these actions may contribute to higher levels
of political liberalizations.
Citizens’ primary goal is to urge the government to implement their policy pref-
erences, removing the current autocratic government from office is not the priority.
They may be able to do it by having some small scales of democracy in hand, which
may be acceptable by the government. What will happen if citizens ask for imme-
diate democracy or large scale of political reform? It is more likely that autocracy
will choose to crack down on democratization movements because they pose a threat
of removal to the autocratic government. The May 18 Gwangju Democratization
Movement in South Korea in1980 is the prime example that the autocracy brutally
2Besides giving away some political and civil rights, for autocratic governments, it is rational if
they could provide policies to maintain their dominance. Scholars have the consensus that economic
development and income inequality can stabilize autocratic regime. For Kennedy (2010), in more
developed countries, low growth is harmful to the government, which implies that development
can foster autocratic rule, on the other hand. Miller (2012) argues that development decrease the
likelihood of violent leader remover, which cause democratization becomes less likely. Moreover,
Houle (2016) finds that income inequality and economic development strengthen state capacity and
also makes democratization becomes less likely. The above discussion implies that democratization
is actually a rare event, given the fact that citizens always reluctant to ask for more liberalization
because the autocracy always has more capability to dissolve citizens’ democratization movement.
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suppressed the movement when citizens asked for immediate democratic reform. The
1989 Tiananmen Square protests is another example that the protests were forcibly
suppressed when asking for more civil liberties, such as freedom of speech, freedom of
press, etc. The Romania Revolution in December 1989 was one of the exceptions of
having immediate democratization. Even though the government tried to crackdown
this movement, but Romania still held their first free and fair, multi-party election
in 1990.
Democratic transition is costly and not easy to be achieved. But political liber-
alization is less costly and may be more efficient to achieve policy goals than democ-
ratization. Because citizens are less motivated to change the whole political regime
in a short period, it helps me to build the two-stage model of democratization. A
two-stage democratization helps us understand the mechanism to connect income
inequality, economic development, political liberalization and democratization.
4.2 The two-stage model of democratization
How does the two-stage model of democratization evolve? Instead of transitioning
to a democracy immediately, citizens “only” ask for more political rights and civil
liberties at the first stage. Later, citizens ask for democratization with the help from
high levels of political liberalization. There are some circumstances that will make an
autocracy more willing to becomes more democratic. I argue that income inequality,
economic development, and the interaction between the two may attribute to higher
political liberalization. In the end, the key element is political liberalization. That
is, liberalization gives citizens the capacity to fight against the government.
4.2.1 The first stage
Since democratization is a slow progressing movement, that means income inequality
and economic development do not always translate into immediate democratization.
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In fact, the effect of both economic indicators may translate into political liberaliza-
tion at the beginning of the conflict between citizens and government. In the end,
there is a higher chance to become a democracy in autocratic regimes with high
political liberalization.
In the first stage, both inequality and development are associated with greater po-
litical liberalization. For citizens living in a society with increased income inequality,
the initial goal is to gain more political rights for more redistributive policies. On the
other hand, citizens living in emerging economies, the initial goal is also to ask for
more political rights in order to protect their property rights, which was earned from
economic development. But the autocratic government will not consent for these
demands immediately, instead, they have two options: to give away some political
powers and civil liberties or simply to reject this demand. Hence, the interactions be-
tween citizens and the government do not necessary lead to a democracy immediately,
instead, it will either remain unchanged or increase liberalization incrementally.
After citizens achieved their primary goals, they may choose to slow down the
action of asking for more political liberalization. They may also ask for more political
liberalization as the autocracy already consented to give it away initially. Hence,
slowing down may be an optimal choice for citizens. There is no further incentive to
protest again as long as the demands have been fulfilled (or at least partially). On
the other hand, citizens acknowledge that a rising income inequality and economic
development may also strengthen government’s capacity to repress (Houle, 2016).
If citizens ask for more political liberalization after initial increase of liberalization,
the autocratic government will perceive a threat and uncertainty from it. Therefore,
constantly asking for more political liberalization will increase the risk of facing series
of punishment from the government.
For the autocratic government in the first stage, they acknowledge that changes
of income inequality and economic development may shift citizens’ preferences to
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more democratic rules. But in the long run, autocracy will realize that they may
also become stronger due to income inequality and economic development, that is,
these effects may increase the stability of current government and simultaneously
weaken citizens’ ability to fight and to organize. For example, Londregan and Poole
(1990) point out that higher economic development reduces the likelihood of coups.
Goldstone et al. (2010) and Miller (2012) find that political instability, such as civil
wars and violent removal of leader, decreases in countries with economic development.
Moreover, Houle (2016) suggests that high income inequality actually increases state
capacity, which weakens oppositions at the same time.
This dissertation assumes that citizens acknowledge that government has become
stronger due to development and inequality, thus asking for immediate democratiza-
tion from the government becomes a dangerous move. For citizens, they will confront
more collective action problems. For autocratic regimes with multiple means, they
will choose to repress because of their increasing coercive capacity. This is the reason
why a two-stage model may provide another explanation.
4.2.2 The Second stage: Why Political liberalizations
An immediate democratization is rare since it is not citizens’ first choice. This phe-
nomenon may be attributed to the rise of competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky
and Way, 2010). This dissertation has no intention to discuss the causes of competi-
tive authoritarian regimes, but I would like to examine when and why democratiza-
tion occur by using a political economy approach. Even though income inequality and
economic development may change citizens’ preferences in favor of democracy (Dahl,
1973; Huntington, 1991; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005), this does not necessary lead
to a democracy immediately. The key element for democratic transition is political
liberalization, without having the capacity to organize anti-government movements,
it becomes less likely to have the chance to transition to democracy.
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Why does political liberalization matter in the second stage process of democra-
tization? First and foremost, citizens also become stronger and have the capacity
to organize because they have more political rights and civil liberties. Democrati-
zation sometimes springs from prolonged and sustained conflicts between ruler and
the ruled. As many of the rational choice theorists suggest, social movement requires
people to participate, but the willingness of participation is critically affected by the
resource they possess. In order to achieve the goal, groups must reduce the likelihood
of having free riding problems (Olson, 1971). Resolving collective action problems
becomes easier as citizens gaining more political powers, such as running for elections,
and civil rights protections, and more freedom to organize civil society groups.
Studies show that authoritarianism is the product of political socialization. Going
through this path of political socialization, citizens live in a setting of authoritarian
rule for a certain time may develop more authoritarian personality (Altemeyer, 1988;
Altemeyer and Altemeyer, 1996). This type of personality is inherently the founda-
tion of support for the autocratic rule. Moreover, studies show a positive relationship
between economic inequality and the support for authoritarianism. Societies with
higher levels of economic inequality are more hierarchical and are more likely to sup-
port autocratic rule (Solt, 2008, 2012). Under this circumstance, a long term author-
itarian regime with high economic inequality has less chance to become democracy.
Why do citizens eventually change their preference from maintaining autocratic rule
to democracy?
4.3 Who will become more liberalized and democratized?
There are two types of autocracies that have higher chances to become more political
liberalized due to income inequality and economic development. Oppositions have
more incentives to organize and to ask the government for more political reforms,
that is, the preferences will change from a less democratic “autocratic government”
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to a more democratic “autocratic government.” One the other hand, the autocratic
government also has more incentives to give up power to citizens.
The first type is in rich countries. Even though economic development does not
necessary lead to democratization, but it will associate with higher liberalization
due to the demand for property right protection from citizens. The second type is
countries with increased income inequality. Citizens are looking for more redistribu-
tive policies by having more political powers in hand. To them, political power is a
means to achieve redistributive policies, it is not that necessary to gain full democ-
racy immediately. However, in countries with high development and high inequality,
the likelihood of liberalization thus decreased. In this type of country, citizens have
difficulty organizing and the government has the capacity to suppress or co-opt the
oppositions.
4.3.1 In Rich Autocratic Regimes
In rich countries, income inequality has negative effect on political liberalization. For
poor citizens, their main demand is income redistribution from rich citizens. But rich
citizens, who are political elites, are much stronger than poor citizens in this type of
country that citizens’ demands may be suppressed. According to Solt (2012), high
income inequality is associated with more support for the authoritarianism among the
poor. Poor citizens personality may tend to be more obedient to the authority because
they need rich people to provide the access to jobs. For the rich, they are more likely
to exercise their authority, such as deference and threat, because the poor simply
rely on rich people. Solt (2012) concludes that “such experiences with authority in
the economic sphere should be expected to affect people’s attitudes toward authority
more generally (704).”
Moreover, in rich and unequal autocracies, both income inequality and economic
development may strength the government, which may make democratization be-
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comes less likely. Several scholars have discussed how development strengthens state
capacity, where they made democratization less likely by developing patronage net-
works and it is co-opting the opposition (Besley and Persson, 2014; Buhaug, 2006;
Hendrix, 2010). Higher income inequality is also harmful to democratization (Ace-
moglu and Robinson, 2005; Boix, 2003). The combination effect of inequality and
development makes it even harder to achieve (Houle, 2016). In this type of country,
the government refuse to provide political liberalization and the citizens have less
incentive to ask for it because of their weakness. Moreover, due to lower levels of
political liberalization, citizens have less capacity to organize and it is difficult for
citizens to develop a pro-democracy attitude. Hence, democratization is difficult to
become a reality in rich and unequal autocracies.3
In a relatively equal country, Boix (2003) predicts a high chance of democratic
transition. Meanwhile, democratization becomes more likely because it is not easy to
develop authoritarian attitude among citizens, that is, ordinary citizens do not have
to rely on the rich to get more economic resources (Miller, 2012). Therefore, rich
autocracies with low income inequality is associated with high political liberalization.
Citizens in this type of country are equally rich, which gives them the capacity
to fulfill two demands: 1) they are looking for property right protection since the
autocracy is not credible in doing it. Citizens also acknowledge that democratic
institutions may better sustain property right protection. As long as the government
can keep their promises in protecting property rights, there is no reason for the
citizens to revolt. However, the promises under authoritarian regime are not always
credible (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005). In order to further protecting property
3Ansell and Samuels (2013, 2010, 2014) have different view on inequality on democratization,
they argue that high inequality in the industrial sector is associated with the emergence of a large
middle class, which, in turn, demands democracy in order to protect its property against expropria-
tion from the government. On the other hand, inequality in the rural sector is associated with land
owner elites that may hurt democratization. Hence, they suggest that inequality in the industrial
sector promotes democracy, while inequality in the rural sector harms democracy.
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right, asking for more political liberalization is the best strategy for citizen in rich
and equal autocracies. 2) Property rights protection may exist in autocratic regimes.
So citizens in some countries may look for dealing with other political or social issues,
such as ethnic divisions or regional conflicts. These demands are non-economic since
this demand has been fulfilled.
According to the economic voting theory, voters in democracies punish the in-
cumbent party for a bad economic performance (Achen, 1992; Hansford and Gomez,
2015; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). On the other hand, voters’ opinions about
the “future” state of the economy also affected their vote choice (Michelitch et al.,
2012; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck, 2001; Weschle, 2014). This kind of reward-punishment
mechanism may potentially remove the incumbent from office in democratic countries.
This economic voting theory may apply to citizens in rich and equal autocracy, they
become more sensitive and are more aware about the state of economy given they
live in a relatively rich country. However, citizens in rich and equal authoritarian
regimes do not have the rule or mechanism to remove the autocracy from office when
the economy is bad.
H1: In rich autocracies, high income inequality is negatively associated with political
liberalization
H2: In rich autocracies, low income inequality is positively associated with political
liberalization
4.3.2 In poor autocracies
In poor autocracies, high income inequality is associated with political liberalization.
Citizens in poor and unequal country may change their preference from autocratic
rule to a more democratic rule when they continue to experience inequality and low
development. The rich do not have enough resource to develop a hierarchical social
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structure. Unlike in rich autocracies, the poor in poor countries cannot expect the
rich to provide various resources to help them to fulfill everyday needs when income
inequality is high. But the rich is still possessing most resources in this poor country.
Therefore, citizens in poor countries may ask for income redistribution and economic
development by having more political rights.
Lastly, low income inequality does not promote political liberalization in poor
autocracies. The resource is scarce and may have been distributed fairly to citizens.
There is no more resources to be redistributed from the rich. In this type of coun-
try, there is no relationship between income inequality, economic development, and
political liberalization.
H3: In poor autocracies, high income inequality is positively associated with political
liberalization
4.4 High Political Liberalization is Associated with
Democratization
Many studies have discussed some possible conditions where the opposition is stronger
than the government. For example, violent leader removal signals that the government
is weak even when the economy is in a good shape (Miller, 2012). Freeman and Quinn
(2012) also find that financial openness in a non-democratic country is associated
with government weakness. Chang and Wu (2016) find that in unequal autocracies,
signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) has a positive effect on regime survival.
Above all, some conditions help democratization and some conditions help autocracy
survival. Level of political liberalization is an important condition that had seldom
been discussed, which helps us to understand how and when the poor can organize
and eventually can reach to become a full democracy.
Political liberalization may help citizens to develop pro-democracy attitude in
authoritarian regimes. Citizens in this country generally develop authoritarian atti-
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tude through political socialization, such as education. But they may also develop
pro-democracy attitude as they learn from semi-democratic institutions if they pos-
sess some levels of political liberalization. This semi-democratic experience weakens
popular perceptions of the regime’s strength because liberalization means citizens
have the strength to limit executive power. Second, political liberalization serves as
a coordination signal for regime opponents. Political liberalization is a composition
of levels of free of association, freedom of speech, share of population with suffrage,
and more (Lindberg et al., 2014), which means the capability of opposing the govern-
ment. As long as there is a regime weakness with stronger opposition, the likelihood
of democratization increased.
The period that follows political liberalization is at high risk for democratization
given the authoritarian regime’s associated weakness. As mentioned before, democra-
tization is a slow process, which involves a constant interaction between the rich and
the poor. Through this constant interaction, the opposition may gain more political
liberalization.
H4: High levels of political liberalization are associated with democratization
There are many aspects to measure political liberalization. The widely used mea-
surement was constructed by Dahl (1973), who proposes the idea of polyarchy to
evaluate political regimes based on levels of participation and levels of contestation.
This electoral index means that a regime where leaders are selected through con-
tested elections held periodically before a broad electorate (Skaaning, Gerring and
Bartusevičius, 2015). Many non-democratic regimes feature with some levels of con-
testation and participation, but these democratic principles are always violated by
the government (Levitsky and Way, 2010). If these democratic principles are less
violated by the government, then citizens are more likely to remove the autocracy
from government through elections.
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It is rational for autocracy to manipulate the elections, since it could stabilize their
tenures in government. Following this logic, we should expect that democratization
becomes less likely if elections in autocratic regime are always being manipulated
(Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2012). In other words, authoritarian regimes
that hold elections tend to last longer than those that do not. However, if a “compet-
itive authoritarian” regimes holds some degree of political uncertainty and potential
instability, then elections appear to increase the likelihood of a stable transition to
democracy (Lindberg, 2009). Also, as Donno (2013) suggests, democratization be-
comes more likely when the autocratic government is facing pressures from domestic
actors and international actors, such as opposition’s coordination and international
pressures. Bernhard, B. Edgell and Lindberg (2019) also suggest that “institutional-
ized election” entails substantial risk to competitive authoritarian regimes, that the
first three elections increase the probability of democratization. That is, when weak-
nesses appeared in authoritarian regimes with elections, there is a chance that elec-
tions could destabilize the autocratic government. Since democratization is citizens’
learning process, through multiple elections, citizens could accumulate democratic
experiences eventually contributing to democratization. Therefore, the relationship
between electoral component and democratization suggests that:
H4.1: Autocracies with high levels of electoral component are more likely to become
democracy.
We should notice that a high level of election in authoritarian regimes might
be the product of the conflict between oppositions and the government. Therefore,
having a certain level of electoral democracy in hand is not enough for oppositions to
“organize” groups. The alternative way is to look for other measurement that contains
civl liberties indices. Lindberg et al. (2014) provided other democracy indices to help
us understand the levels of political liberalization because democracy is a multi-
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dimensional concept, such as electoral component, liberal component, participatory
component (Lindberg et al., 2014). Liberal component and participatory component
signal citizens’ ability to organize and participate in non-electoral events. To be
more specific, the liberal component of democracy can be achieved through protected
civil liberties, strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances “that limited the
use of executive power” (Lindberg et al., 2014). On the other hand, a participatory
component of democracy emphasizes “local elections and other non-electoral forms of
political participation” such as civil society organizations and mechanisms of direct
democracy (Lindberg et al., 2014).
H4.2: Autocracies with high levels of liberal component are more likely to become
democracy.
H4.3: Autocracies with high levels of participatory component are more likely to
become democracy.
We should also notice that liberal component and participatory component of
democracy are highly correlated with electoral component of democracy. High levels
of electoral component of democracy help citizens to become part of the decision
making process, such as member of the parliament. This gives citizens the chances to
increase other types of component of democracy through legislation. In general, both
liberal and participatory component of democracy come after electoral component of
democracy.
These components of democracy are important to the transition to democracy
as democracy requires cumulative experience of multiple elections and civil liberty
practices. As I mentioned, citizens will need these components to help them to
facilitate successful collective actions, both electoral and non-electoral, to remove the




This chapter discusses the strategy and the method of testing my hypotheses. For the
first stage of democratization, I will test the relationship between income inequality
and different types of political liberalization, which is also conditional on economic
development. For the second stage, I will test how political liberalization, such as
electoral component, liberal component, and participatory component of democracy,
are associated with democratization.
5.1 Data and Empirical Strategies
In order to test my hypotheses, I rely on different sources of datasets to create a
dataset that contains income inequality index, economic development index, and
political liberalization indices, along with other control variables, such as GDP growth
in per capita, post-Soviet Union country, Oil Exporting country, Islamic Culture, and
democratic neighbors. The structure of my dataset is country-year, which includes
information on more that 4,000 country-year observations involving as many as 125
countries over 50 years.
5.2 Dependent Variable (1): Democracy and Dictatorship
To test the effect of income inequality and economic development on democratiza-
tion, I need to identify what countries should be included in my analyses. First of
all, I need to identify those countries that were not democracies in the time period
between 1960 and 2010. Second, I will also need to identify those countries that had
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experienced democratic transition during this period. Therefore, the first step is to
use an appropriate measurement to define democratic countries.
According to Przeworski (1991b)’s research, a democratic regime must have the
government offices filled by contested elections. To be more specific, both the chief
executive office, such as the president or prime ministers, and the legislative body,
such as Congress and Parliament, must be filled by “contested” elections. More
importantly, the elections should be implemented based on free and fair principles,
which means that opposition candidates have the same chance of winning as the
incumbent. In addition, all eligible citizens should have equal access to voting.
Przeworski (1991b) continued to point out that this minimalist measurement
should contain at least three additional features in order to help us to identify democ-
racies and non-democracies. The first feature is that we have to make sure the out-
come of the election should not be known before it takes place. Second, the winner of
the candidate or political party should actually take the office. Lastly, elections that
meet these two features should occur regularly. Therefore, most scholars classified
democracy and autocracy based on this minimalist dichotomous measure of political
regime (e.g. Alvarez et al., 1996; Przeworski et al., 2000).
Later, this classification was extended by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
They point out some shortcomings of this minimalist measurement. They argued that
we need more rules to assess whether the offices were filled by contested elections.
So, in order to classify democracy and autocracy, we need to follow these four rules:
First, the chief executive must be chosen by popular election; Second, the legislative
branch must be popularly elected; Third, there must be more than one political
party competing in the elections. Fourth, an alternation in power under electoral
rules identical to the ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken
place. These four rules provide a scrutiny standards to classify democracy to prevent
wrong false classifications (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010).
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At the same time, Polity IV and Freedom House also provide their own measures of
democracy. But Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) argued that their Democracy
and Dictatorship dataset is different from Polity IV and the Freedom House because
they conceptualized democracy differently. The purpose of this dissertation is to
discuss democratization, the Democracy and Dictatorship dataset is more straight-
forward to identify democratic countries than Polity IV and Freedom House. Other
than Polity IV and Freedom House, some scholars used trichotomous or polychoto-
mous measures to classify different types of regime, such as Epstein et al. (2006). In
Epstein et al. (2006)’s research, they classified regimes into three categories: full au-
tocracy, partial democracy, and full democracy. But Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland
(2010) argued that “the middle categories actually add little information since their
distributions are bimodal”. Essentially, the middle category contains the name of
democracy, such as semi-democracy, it is still not a democracy. Therefore, measures
of democracy should not be interchangeable (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010).
Based on Democracy and Dictatorship dataset, I have 125 autocratic countries in
my analyses. All of these countries were either non-democratic or have the experience
of transition to democracy from 1960 and 2010. Some of the countries in my analyses
were established after 1960 and some of them became democracy in early 1980s.
Therefore, the total number of the observations is 4110. Table A.1 in the Appendix
lists all 125 countries in my analyses and it is classified based on regions.1
In my analyses, there are 112 democratic transitions. Some countries in my analy-
ses had difficulty maintaining their democratic rules, which they experienced multiple
democratic transitions. For example, Thailand had experienced a coup four times in
1976, 1977, 1991, and 2006. Those coups did not last too long, as Thailand re-gained
democratic rules after the end of these coups. However, the most recent coup hap-
1Countries, such as Latvia, Lithuania, are not included in my sample is because these countries
became democracy in the year of their independence.
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pened in 2014. General Prayut Chan-o-cha, Commander of the Royal Thai Army
(RTA), launched a coup against the Yingluck cabinet. Later, the military found a
military junta, called National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to govern Thai-
land. Even though Thailand held a general election in 2019, but Prayut’s party is
still the largest party in the House of Representative. South Korea also experienced
two democratic transitions. The May 16 military coup in South Korea in 1961 de-
stroyed the democratic rule that was established in 1948. Park Chung-hee, the leader
of the army, became the president of South Korea until his assassination in 1979.
In June 1987, the June Democracy Movement brought mass protests and forced the
government to hold free and fair elections, which led to the establishment of the Sixth
Republic. After the election, South Korea became a democracy. Table A.2 in the
Appendix lays out all democratic transitions in my dataset, I also include the num-
ber of democratic transitions for each country. Therefore, based on Democracy and
Dictatorship dataset, I will test the relationship between income inequality, economic
development, democratization among these 125 countries across 1960 to 2010.
5.3 Dependent Variable (2) and Explanatory Variable: Political
Liberalization
Coppedge et al. (2016) stated that democracy is more than simply elections. This idea
has already reached many scholars, that many of them proposed different models of
democracy in order to expand electoral definitions of democracy. For example, some
important components, such as liberal constitutionalism, popular participation, socio-
economic equality, and deliberation, became widely discussed (e.g Coppedge et al.,
2011, 2016; Cunningham, 2002).
Since democracy has multi-dimensions, Lindberg et al. (2014) and Coppedge et al.
(2016) offer key principles of measurement to define democracy, such as electoral com-
ponent, liberal component, and participatory component of democracy. For the elec-
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toral component, it extends Robert Dahl’s (1967) concept of polyarchy that includes
the following concepts: (1) elected officials; (2) free, fair and frequent elections; (3)
freedom of expression; (4) associational autonomy; and (5) universal suffrage. The
liberal component of democracy gauges how the civil liberties are protected, such as
rule of law, checks and balance, that limit the use of executive power. The participa-
tory component examines how much citizen can participate in all political processes.
It especially focuses on non-electoral forms of political participation, such as civil
society organizations.
Even though the initial purpose for the above scholars was to offer a new measure
to discuss about democracy, some of the principles and components they proposed
can also be seen in non-democratic countries. For non-democratic countries, even
though they do not meet the criteria of the minimalist democracy, many of them
can possess some certain levels of the democratic component that Coppedge et al.
(2016) proposed. For example, in 1969 Taiwan, the KMT government announced
the first “supplementary” legislative election to fill in vacant seats in the Legislative
Yuan. The KMT government continued to hold supplementary elections every three
years until the lifting of the Martial Law in 1987. This example shows that even
under autocratic rule, Taiwan still held some certain levels of electoral component of
democracy.
But not every autocratic regime is the same, Myanmar held a general election in
1990. This election was the first multi-party election since 1960. Before the election,
the government of Myanmar had been ruled by a military dictatorship for 30 years.2
Compared to Taiwan under autocratic regime, the level of electoral component of
democracy in Myanmar was lower than the level of electoral component of democracy
in Taiwan. Figure 5.1 lays out values of electoral component of democracy for Taiwan
2The election was won convincingly by Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy
(NLD). However, the military government refused to recognize the results.
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and Myanmar from 1960 to 1996 and South Africa from 1960 to 1994. All three
countries were not democracy during this period, but all of them possessed some






















































country Myanmar Taiwan South Africa
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Figure 5.1: Components of Democracy for Myanmar, South Africa and Taiwan
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This logic can also be applied to the liberal and participatory components of
democracy. For liberal component of democracy, Taiwan and South Africa remained
at similar levels before 1985, while Myanmar remained at relatively low levels. During
the same time period, only Taiwan remained at relatively high levels of participatory
component of democracy. Many of the civil organizations were allowed to form under
KMT government. In South Africa, the level of participatory component started to
increase around 1987. This was due to more and more nonviolent and violent actions
to resist against apartheid (Abel, 2015).
According to the examples I mentioned above, different autocratic regimes have
different levels of political liberalization or democracy. The Variety of Democracy
(V-Dem) project provides different indices to measure different aspects of democracy
(or political liberalization) (Coppedge et al., 2019). I will rely on electoral compo-
nent, liberal component, and participatory component of democracy as the dependent
variables in the first stage of my theory. In the second stage, these three components
are the main explanatory variables to explain democratization.
5.4 Explanatory Variable: Income Inequality
In order to test the association between income inequality and democratization, I
rely on the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) to get the
information about income inequality for each country in my dataset. This SWIID
dataset is constructed by Solt (2016). Solt relied on data from the Luxembourg
Income Survey, the United Nations University’s World Institute for Development
Economics Research, and many other national and international sources to construct
this SWIID dataset.3 Even though both Luxembourg Income Survey and the U.N.
dataset provide relatively comprehensive information on income inequality for each
country, the biggest problem is that both of them have too many missing values. So,
3For more information, please visit SWIID website: https://fsolt.org/swiid/
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Solt (2009) stated that the SWIID maximizes the comparability of inequality data
for the largest possible sample of countries and years.
The SWIID dataset uses Gini coefficient to measure income inequality. The Gini
index describes the “distribution of income across size-adjusted households after gov-
ernment taxes and transfers are taken into account (Solt, 2015).” Theoretically, the
Gini index ranges from zero to one-hundred. A Gini index of zero means the net
income received by each household in the society is equally distributed. A Gini index
of one-hundred means that all income in the society goes to a single household. In
reality, there is no such society in the modern world that has Gini coefficient of zero
or one-hundred. In my sample, the lowest Gini coefficient is 21.73 in Romania in
1990; the highest Gini coefficient, about 61.05, were observed in Swaziland in 1994.
Based on the SWIID dataset, Figure 5.2 provides the Gini index for each country,
both democratization and autocracy, in 2010 in my dataset. The Gini index can rage








Figure 5.2: Gini Coefficient for Each Country, source: SWIID dataset
A problem still arises when we find that some of the Gini coefficients are still
missing from the SWIID dataset. For example, the Gini index for Albania from 1960
to 1995 are still unavailable in the SWIID dataset. In my dataset, the total number of
missing values for the Gini index is 2,404, which exceeds fifty percent of my sample.
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This means that when I conduct my statistical analyses, my models will drop at
least half of my observations, which will significantly jeopardize my theory and my
findings. More importantly, the Gini indices for thirty-eight countries in the year
of democratic transition are also unavailable. That is, missing values can produce
biased estimates and will lead to invalid conclusions if we do not take actions.
Missing value is a common challenge to research. Both observational dataset and
individual dataset are encountering the problem of missing value, which may lead to
selection bias and could potentially invalidate the entire research. In order to reduce
this uncertainty, Honaker and King (2010) developed an approach to analyzing data
with missing value, which is useful for most “time-series cross-section” datasets. By
using multiple imputation, we will greatly increase the information of our observations
and we will be able to generate more robust and unbiased findings.
In R, I use the Amelia II package to perform multiple imputation to impute those
missing values. For the Gini coefficient, it has a theoretical boundary, which ranges
from zero to one-hundred. However, based on other information provided, the Amelia
II package could generate values that either exceeds one-hundred or lower than zero.
In order to satisfy this theoretical boundary, I specified the range from zero to one-
hundred to refrain Amelia II from generating unsatisfied values. In Figure 5.2, we
can clearly see that multiple imputation imputed those missing values in the original
dataset, it also has the range between zero to one-hundred.
Some scholars prefer to use different indices to measure income inequality. For
example, Houle (2016) used capital share of the value added in the manufacturing
sector to measure economic inequality. Houle (2016) stated that “capital shares give
the proportion of the value created within specific firms that accrues to the owners of
these specific firms, as opposed to the laborers (513).” However, this index does not
capture how the wealth actually distributed in the society, instead, it only captures
how the value been distributed within a certain industry. Other scholars, like Ansell
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Figure 5.3: Imputation for Gini coefficient of Income Inequality
and Samuels (2014), proposed that land inequality has the effect on democratization,
instead of the distribution of the wealth. Even though there are some disagreement
with the meaning and the measurement of income inequality, I will still stick with
using the Gini index as the measure of income inequality because my theory focuses
on economic development’s conditional effect on the association between income in-
equality and political liberalization.
5.5 Explanatory Variable: Economic Development
As my theory lays out, I will bring back economic development to the discussion
on the relationship between income inequality and democratization. Even though
economic development has an association with democratization, it does not directly
lead to democratization. But this unambiguous association should play an important
role on the relationship between income inequality and democratization.
In this dissertation, I develop a proxy for economic development by using GDP
per capita. This GDP per capita information comes from Penn World Tables dataset,
which provides GDP per capita information between 1950 and 2015 (Feenstra and
Timmer, 2014). GDP is the total market value of all final goods and services produced
in a country, and GDP per capita is calculated by dividing GDP by a country’s
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population. In my sample, the lowest GDP per capita is $30 in Rwanda in 1962; the
highest GDP per capita is $45,933, it was observed in Singapore in 2010. Compared
to SWIID dataset, the PWT dataset provides more comprehensive information of
GDP per capita for each country. There are still 188 missing values in my sample,
therefore, I also use multiple imputation to make sure my sample will not lose these
information when running my statistical models. In my statistical models, I will add
GDP per capita as an independent variable. I will also create an interaction term,
which is the combination of Gini index and GDP per capita, to estimate how economic
development conditions the effect of income inequality on political liberalization. The
GDP per capita is also lagged by one year in the main results.
5.6 Control variables
5.6.1 GDP per capita growth
Beyond my main explanatory variables, I also include several control variables that
may have correlations with political liberalization and democratization. This will
provide a more clear picture about the effect of income inequality and the conditional
effect of economic development. The first variable of interest is the growth of GDP
per capita. This variable provides information about the changes of GDP per capita
in percentage for each country in the certain year. The growth rate can be either
positive or negative.
5.6.2 Former Communist Countries
The second control variable is a binary coding of whether the country is a former
communist country. There are three types of country can be counted . The first
type is the post-Soviet states, they are the 15 republics that gained independence
from the Soviet Union following its breakup in 1991. The second type of the country
is the former members of the Warsaw Pact. They are the member countries of the
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Table 5.1: List of the Former Communist Countries
Post Soviet
Union





Albania, Bulgaria, Czech, Slovakia, Hungary,
Poland, Romania
Others China, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea
Warsaw Pact in order to provide mutual defense. All member countries had a similar
ideological stance with the Soviet-Union. The last category is neither post-Soviet
states nor former member of the Warsaw Pact. These countries were Marxist-Leninist
states, some of them were allied with the U.S.S.R., but did not belong to the Warsaw
Pact. Table 5.1 lays out all three types of former Soviet alliance countries.
5.6.3 Islamic Culture
In previous studies, scholars have expressed concern about the negative effect of the
Islam culture on democratization (e.g Karatnycky, 2002), especially for countries with
large Muslim population (Fish, 2002). I will add another control variable that has
a binary coding of Islamic country. For this variable, 1 refers Islamic country, and
o refers to others. To be more specific, Islamic country includes Islamic state and
countries who endorsed Islam as their state religion. An Islamic state is a form of
government based on Islamic law, which is normally written into the constitution.
5.6.4 OPEC member and oil reliance
Oil rents can be translated into popular support for authoritarianism, therefore, re-
liance on oil and other mineral exports, reduces the likelihood of democracy (Barro,
1999; Ross, 2001; Fish, 2002). I add a control variable that is related to oil export-




According Huntington (1991), snowballing is one of the main causes of democrati-
zation, that a success of democracy in one country may cause other countries to
democratize. The last control variable is to see how many democratic neighbors the
country has. We may expect to see a spatial dependence effect that more democratic
neighbor may bring about some effects on the autocratic regime.
5.7 Summary of Research Design
There are multiple choices of different measures for the variables I am using in this
research. So this chapter carefully justifies the reasons why choosing these measures.
The next chapter will provide empirical evidence for the first stage and the second




The First Stage: The Increase of Political
Liberalizations
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the first stage of the two-stage pro-
cess of democratization model. The first stage of my theoretical model hypothesizes
that democratization does not occur in a short period, instead, an autocratic regime
moves slowly from low political liberalization to high liberalization before becoming
a democracy. I will present several statistical models to illustrate how income in-
equality and economic development are associated with different types of political
liberalization.
6.1 Is there a Direct connection between Income Inequality,
Economic development and Democratization?
Before moving to discuss the effect of income inequality and the effect of economic
development on political liberalization, I look into some models to observe if there is
a direct relationship between these economic variables and democratization.
Table 6.1 lays out models to test the relationship between two explanatory vari-
ables and democratization. The dependent variable in all models are the dichotomous
measure of democratization. For model 3, GDP per capita is positive but not sig-
nificant. The Gini index is also positive and is significant. Also, the interaction
between GDP per capita and the Gini index is not significant. The results in Table
6.1 show unclear relationship between economic indicators and democratization, be-
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GDP per capita−1 0.019 0.257
(0.045) (0.280)




Constant −3.743∗∗∗ −4.604∗∗∗ −4.902∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.632) (0.732)
Observations 3,742 3,930 3,742
Log Likelihood −473.423 −476.828 −472.080
Akaike Inf. Crit. 952.847 959.656 954.160
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
cause it provides insufficient information to explain it. This gives me the opportunity
to think about how we can connect the relationship between income inequality, eco-
nomic development, and democratization. As I proposed in this dissertation, both
income inequality and economic development may be associated with democratiza-
tion, but they affect each other indirectly. The following sections discuss the effect of
income inequality and economic development on political liberalization.
6.2 Model Specification For the First Stage
In order to test my hypotheses, I compile a dataset of autocratic regimes and countries
that experienced democratic transition between 1960 and 2010. The final dataset
contains 122 countries and the total number of observation is 4,223. This dataset has
repeated observations on the same countries, therefore, “time-series cross-section”
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(TSCS) models are useful for testing my hypotheses because the variation in the
dependent variables comes from both the dynamic and cross-sectional factors (Beck,
2001). For my models, I use a mixed effect models to estimate the effect of my
explanatory variables.
6.3 The increase of the Electoral component
I present my findings for the electoral component mode in Table 6.2. The electoral
component of democracy, as theorized by Lindberg et al. (2014), is a “thin” concept
that focuses on “the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens through com-
petition for the approval of a broad electorate during periodic elections.” Model 1 is
the result without the interaction between the Gini index and GDP per capita. For
GDP per capita, holding all else constant, it is positive and statistically significant.
This means that the increase of GDP per capita is correlated with the increase of
the electoral component of democracy. The Gini index is also positive but it is not
significant. Model 2 in the same table, I include an interaction between the Gini
index and GDP per capita. The result shows that this interaction is positive and
statistically significant at p < 0.05, suggesting that rich and unequal countries are
less likely to develop higher levels of electoral component of democracy. The Gini
index becomes significant, meaning that when GDP per capita is zero, high income
inequality is positively associated with electoral component of democracy.
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Table 6.2: Estimates of electoral component of democracy
Dependent variable:
Electoral Component of Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita−1 0.014∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.028∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.028∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.026∗∗∗ (0.006)
Gini index−1 0.029 (0.038) 0.068∗ (0.042) 0.064 (0.042) 0.025 (0.042)
GDP−1*Gini−1 −0.036∗∗ (0.016) −0.036∗∗ (0.016) −0.033∗∗ (0.015)
Economic growth 0.068∗∗∗ (0.026)
Former Communist −0.048 (0.038) −0.055 (0.039)
Islamic culture −0.081∗∗ (0.038) −0.076∗ (0.041)
OPEC 0.040 (0.043) 0.059 (0.043)
Regional democracy 0.113∗∗∗ (0.009)
Military coup −0.020∗∗∗ (0.006)
Constant 0.401∗∗∗ (0.020) 0.385∗∗∗ (0.022) 0.404∗∗∗ (0.024) 0.386∗∗∗ (0.025)
Observations 3,892 3,892 3,892 3,637
Akaike Inf. Crit. −4,428.359 −4,424.996 −4,411.053 −4,272.094
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Model 3 and model 4 in Table 6.2 both include more control variables. After
adding control variables, the results of the interaction between the Gini index and
GDP per capita remain the same in both models. For those control variables, eco-
nomic growth is positive but not statistically significant. For countries that were
formally allied with the Soviet Union have an effect on the electoral component of
democracy. Islamic state is negative and statistically significant, meaning that coun-
tries that endorsed Islam as their state religion are less likely to develop the electoral
component of democracy. This finding is consistent with previous studies, such as
Fish (2002) and Karatnycky (2002). Members of the OPEC are not associated with
electoral component of democracy.
If a country has democratic neighbors, it is positively associated with more elec-
toral component of democracy. As Huntington (1991) suggests, democracy has
a spillover/snowballing effect, which might influence democracy’s non-democratic
neighbors. However, the dependent variable for Table 6.2 is one of the measure
of political liberalization, not democracy. Lastly, if a country experienced a military
coup, the effect on electoral component is negative and statistically significant. This























GDP per capita $100 (poor) $8,000 (rich)
Figure 6.1: Conditional Effect of Economic Development on the association between
Income Inequality and Electoral Component of Democracy, (with 90% CI)
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the predicted values of electoral component of democracy
using model 3 in Table 6.2. The solid line in Figure 6.2 depicts the expected values
of the electoral component of democracy for rich autocratic regimes. First, a rich
and low income inequality country has higher levels of electoral component. Citizens
in a rich and equal autocratic regime benefit from a good economy. We may expect
to see citizens reward the autocratic government due to good economy, therefore,
the demand for more political liberalizations may not be necessary. But citizens
in this type of country may look for more property protection since the autocratic
government may not credible in protecting citizens’ property. They may also look for
other social issues because they are strong enough to do it. Therefore, participating
in the decision making process is important for the citizens who benefited from good
economy.
Elections, even though may not be highly free and fair, are less costly than other
means, such as protests, to achieve their goals. For the autocratic government, gradu-
ally releasing small degrees of electoral rights may temporarily fulfill the demand from
citizens who look for property right protection. Choosing repression is not rational,
as citizens in this type of country are relatively strong due to economic growth.
Second, in a rich and highly unequal autocratic regime, the expected levels of the
electoral component of democracy is lower than in a rich and equal autocratic regime.
Even though this type of country is rich, the wealth is not distributed fairly, meaning
that ordinary citizens are too weak to organize the opposition for more access to the
decision making process. Their priority is certainly income redistribution, but when
facing a strong autocratic government who possess most resources, asking for eco-
nomic interests from the government is the “substitute” demand. For the autocratic
government, since it is rich and strong, simply distributing a little from their benefits
to the fellow citizens may be helpful in eliminating discontents. Therefore, this type
of autocracy is associated with lower levels of electoral component of democracy.
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In the same figure, the dashed line depicts the expected values of the electoral
component of democracy for poor autocratic regimes. The expected values of the
electoral component of democracy in unequal autocratic regimes are higher than in
equal autocratic regimes. But the level of the electoral component of democracy in
poor and unequal autocratic regimes does not increase significantly. This implies that
citizens have less incentive to ask for political reforms in poor autocracies, but highly
unequal autocratic regimes still have higher chances to increase political liberalization.
Poor citizens are too poor and they are not satisfied with the limited resources,
which have been distributed unfairly. Poor citizens ask for more political powers in
order to not just redistribute the limited resources, but may also focus on economic
development, since the autocratic government failed to do the both.
6.4 Liberal Component of Democracy
In Table 6.3, I report models of the liberal component of democracy. Model 2 is the
result with the interaction between the Gini index and GDP per capita. For GDP per
capita, holding all else constant, it is positive and statistically significant. Since this
model includes the interaction term, this means that the increase of GDP per capita
is correlated with the increase of the liberal component of democracy when the Gini
index is zero. On the other hand, the Gini index in the model is also positive and
statistically significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that the increase of the Gini index is
correlated with the increase of the liberal component of democracy when the GDP
per capita is zero. For the interaction term of the Gini index and GDP per capita, it
is negative and statistically significant at p < 0.05. This result suggests that a rich
and unequal country has a negative effect on the liberal component of democracy,
which may be harmful for democratization in the future.
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Table 6.3: Estimates of liberal component of democracy
Dependent variable:
Liberal component of democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita−1 0.001 (0.001) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.013∗∗∗ (0.004)
Gini index−1 0.073∗∗∗ (0.023) 0.101∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.097∗∗∗ (0.026) 0.088∗∗∗ (0.027)
GDP −1 *Gini −1 −0.027∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.027∗∗∗ (0.010) −0.032∗∗∗ (0.010)
Electoral Democracy−1 0.637∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.636∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.636∗∗∗ (0.010) 0.647∗∗∗ (0.011)
Economic growth 0.018 (0.016)
Former Communist −0.091∗∗∗ (0.031) −0.088∗∗∗ (0.029)
Islamic culture −0.005 (0.031) 0.016 (0.032)
OPEC −0.035 (0.031) −0.039 (0.030)
Regional democracy 0.012∗∗ (0.006)
Military coup −0.021∗∗∗ (0.004)
Constant 0.040∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.028∗ (0.016) 0.047∗∗∗ (0.018) 0.039∗∗ (0.018)
Observations 3,858 3,858 3,858 3,604
Log Likelihood 4,032.951 4,032.831 4,029.893 3,779.496
Akaike Inf. Crit. −8,053.902 −8,051.663 −8,039.787 −7,532.993
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −8,016.354 −8,007.858 −7,977.208 −7,452.526
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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In Figure 6.2, I depict the expected values for the liberal component of democracy
for poor ($100, the dashed line) and rich ($8,000, the solid line) countries. First, when
income inequality is low in rich autocratic regimes, the expected liberal component of
democracy is higher than in rich autocratic regimes with high income inequality. For
citizens in rich and equal autocratic regimes, as I mentioned previously, the reason
they ask for more civil liberties and a strong rule of law may be because they are
looking for better property right protection. By having a higher level of civil liberties
and a stronger rule of law, it implies that their properties can be better protected.
For citizens in rich and unequal autocratic regimes, civil liberties and rule of law are
not their primary goals, they mainly are looking for economic opportunities from the
rich, such as job opportunities or housing policies. Since, there is not much demand
from citizens, the autocratic government of this type of country has less incentive to























GDP per capita $100 (poor) $8,000 (rich)
Figure 6.2: Conditional effect of economic development on the association between income
inequality and liberal component of democracy
The dashed line in Figure 6.2 depicts the expected values for the liberal component
of democracy for poor autocratic regimes. When income inequality is low in poor
autocratic regimes, citizens have less motivation to ask for more political reforms.
Poor citizens realize that there is not much they can get from the rich, since everyone
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is almost equally poor. However, when income inequality is high in poor autocratic
regimes, the level of the liberal component of democracy is higher. Why do poor
citizens ask for more civil liberties and a stronger rule of law? First, these new rights
may help poor citizens ask for more income redistribution from the rich as the limited
resources are in rich’s hands. Second, as citizens pressure the autocratic government
to focus on economic development and to reduce income inequality, higher levels of
the liberal component of democracy may also help them to keep away autocratic
government’s punishments.
However, where does the liberal component of democracy comes from? Does the
autocratic government always grant it when citizens ask for it? As Lindberg et al.
(2014) propose, the liberal component of democracy is “achieved through constitu-
tionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances
that limit the use of executive power,” which implies that it may have to be passed
and signed into laws. These rights may be given from the autocratic government, but
elections may be helpful when citizens are looking for these rights. Elections provide
opportunities for citizens to be part of the decision making process, that increases
the chances to make civil liberties into law.
Therefore, I include the electoral component of democracy in all my models as one
of the explanatory variables. After controlling all other variables, the electoral compo-
nent of democracy in all models in Table 6.3, is positive and statistically significant at
p < 0.01. This means that electoral component of democracy and liberal component
of democracy are highly correlated (see Figure 6.3), which suggests that elections in
autocratic regimes may promote higher levels of civil liberties and a stronger rule of
law. Even though the statistical result does not tell us the causal relations between
the two, in theory, civil liberty protections may come after having the rights to par-
ticipate in elections. Therefore, if citizens can be represented in the government, it
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Figure 6.3: The association between electoral component of democracy and liberal com-
ponent of democracy
For other control variables in model 3 in Table 6.3, the result is consistent with
the model of electoral component of democracy in Table 6.2. Regional democracy
is still positively associated with the liberal component of democracy, while military
coup is still harmful on this component of democracy.
6.5 Participation: Non-electoral activities
The last component of democracy that may increase due to income inequality and
economic development is the participatory component of democracy. The participa-
tory component of democracy is the values of active participations for all citizens in
non-political forms of political participation, this includes civil society organizations
(Lindberg et al., 2014). Citizens have the motivations to ask for higher levels par-
ticipation to help them to achieve their primary goals. I present the findings for the
participatory component of democracy models in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4: Estimates of participatory component of democracy
Dependent variable:
Participatory Component of Democracy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita −1 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.010∗∗∗ (0.003)
Gini Index −1 0.030 (0.020) 0.050∗∗ (0.022) 0.047∗∗ (0.022) 0.037 (0.023)
GDP −1*Gini −1 −0.018∗∗ (0.008) −0.018∗∗ (0.008) −0.018∗∗ (0.008)
Electoral Democracy−1 0.463∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.462∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.462∗∗∗ (0.009) 0.455∗∗∗ (0.009)
Economic Growth 0.011 (0.014)
Former Communist −0.076∗∗∗ (0.027) −0.076∗∗∗ (0.027)
Islamic culture −0.027 (0.027) −0.020 (0.029)
OPEC −0.0003 (0.027) 0.003 (0.026)
Regional democracy 0.028∗∗∗ (0.005)
Military coup −0.007∗∗ (0.003)
Constant 0.077∗∗∗ (0.013) 0.069∗∗∗ (0.014) 0.086∗∗∗ (0.015) 0.083∗∗∗ (0.016)
Observations 3,890 3,890 3,890 3,636
Log Likelihood 4,682.931 4,681.521 4,677.511 4,395.238
Akaike Inf. Crit. −9,353.861 −9,349.043 −9,335.023 −8,764.475
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −9,316.264 −9,305.179 −9,272.361 −8,683.893
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Model 2 is the result with the interaction between the Gini index and GDP per
capita. For GDP per capita, holding all else constant, it is positive and statisti-
cally significant. Since this model includes the interaction term, this means that the
increase of GDP per capita is correlated with the increase of the participatory com-
ponent of democracy when the Gini index is zero. On the other hand, the Gini index
in model 2 is also positive and statistically significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that the
increase of the Gini index is correlated with the increase of the participatory com-
ponent of democracy when the GDP per capita is zero. For the interaction term of
the Gini index and GDP per capita, it is negative and statistically significant at p <
0.01. This result suggests that a rich and unequal country has a negative effect on the
participatory component of democracy, which may be harmful for democratization in
the future.
I also depict the expected values for the participatory component of democracy as
shown in Figure 6.4. For citizens in rich and equal autocratic regimes, their primary
goal is property right protection. A strong civil society may help them to solve
the collective action problem when reaching out to the autocratic government for
making a credible promise in protecting their properties. On the other hand, again,
the incentive for citizens to ask for more participation decreases in rich and unequal
autocratic regimes. This is because poor citizens are facing a strong government.
Besides more income redistribution, poor citizens’ primary goal may also include more
job opportunities, which may heavily rely on the rich’s authoritative distributions.
Therefore, the level of the participatory component of democracy remains low because
the demand is scarce.
In poor autocratic regimes, citizens have no incentives to ask for more participa-
tion when income inequality is low. They acknowledge that there is not much resource
in the society. Since the society is relatively equal, citizens will not be able to gain
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Figure 6.4: Conditional Effect of Economic Development on the association between
Income Inequality and the Participatory Component
levels of participatory component of democracy is higher than poor and equal auto-
cratic regimes. A stronger civil society helps poor citizens to ask for redistribution
from the rich because the rich possess the limited resource the society has.
Figure 6.5 also shows a strong correlation between the electoral component of
democracy and the participatory component of democracy. As I mentioned pre-
viously, the electoral component democracy may help a country to develop other
components of democracy. Even though the evidence does not show a clear causal
relationship, other types of components of democracy are difficult to be developed
without the help of electoral component of democracy. The right of organizing and
maintaining civil society should be written into law, which can be achieved through
legislations by elections.
6.6 Summary of the first stage
In the first stage of the process of democratization, I find that both income inequal-
ity and economic development are associated with the electoral component, liberal
component, and participatory component of democracy. However, the interaction
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Figure 6.5: The association between the electoral component of democracy and the par-
ticipatory Component
political liberalization. This suggests that an unequal and rich autocratic regime is
less likely to grant political liberalization to their fellow citizens. For citizens in equal
and rich autocratic regimes, the reason why they ask for more political liberalization
is because they are looking for more property right protections. Political liberaliza-
tion can increase in poor and unequal autocratic regimes. Poor citizens are looking
for redistribution and more economic opportunities if they can be part of the decision
making process.
Moreover, the electoral component of democracy may be helpful for the increase
of the liberal and participatory components of democracy. Elections may assist the
poor and the oppositions to become part of the decision making process, such as
members of the parliament. Being part of the decision making process, other types
of political liberalization are more likely to be promoted and protected.
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Chapter 7
The Second stage: Political liberalization and
Democratization
The previous chapter discusses the relationship between income inequality, economic
development, and political liberalization. In this section, I will discuss how to con-
nect political liberalization and democratization in the second stage process of de-
mocratization. In the second stage, citizens had learned from their semi-democratic
institutions, such as election, rule of law, and civil society. This slow and progressing
learning process helps citizens to develop less pro-authoritarian attitudes and a less
hierarchical society, which may eventually help democratization.
7.1 Model specification
The dependent variable is a binary coding of democratization: zero means no democ-
ratization for country X in year Y, and one means democratization for country X in
year Y. For example, democratization variable is one for Taiwan in 1996. When the
dependent variable is a binary, most studies employ maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE), such as logistic regression, to estimate the models (Long and Freese, 2006).1
For my dataset, the observations consist of country years, and cluster by country. I
1While many studies choose to use MLE regression when the dependent variable is binary, I
have decided to use linear probability model (LPM), which employs the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression. Recently, many studies have pointed out the weakness of using logit of probit
model when an outcome variable is binary (e.g Gibson, 2019; Hellevik, 2009). Breen, Karlson and
Holm (2018) point out that it is difficult to interpret the results when using non-linear probability
models. Instead, an OLS regression allows researchers to interpret our the results straightforwardly,
in particular the one of the interaction term.
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therefore use a multilevel model with both fixed and random effects. Mixed effect or
hierarchical linear models (HLM) take account of the correlations between the error
terms and allow us to estimate both the effects at two different levels. For my mod-
els, the first level is the level of country-year variables, and the second level is the
variables that vary across countries.
7.2 Empirical results
In Table 7.1, I present three different models of democratization. Since the electoral
component of democracy is highly correlated with the liberal and the participatory
components of democracy (see Chapter 6), I only include one of the components of
democracy as the main explanatory variable for each model.
Model 1 in Table 7.1 presents the effect of the electoral component of democ-
racy on democratization. This variable is lagged for one year in order to examine
if the previous year of the level of electoral democracy has effect on the likelihood
of democracy in the next year. As expected, the electoral component of democracy
is associated with democratic transition. We see a positive correlation between the
electoral component of democracy and democratization. As I mentioned, democrati-
zation is a learning process for citizens to realize the benefits of having democratic
institutions. This learning process may also decrease citizens’ respect for the author-
ity and may make the society less hierarchical. As long as citizens can have some
accesses to the decision making process, such as becoming the member of the par-
liament, they do not have to always to rely on the autocratic government to provide
public goods. Eventually, elections may be one of the means to remove the autocratic
government.
The second model presents the relationship between the liberal component of
democracy and democratization. The result is positive and statistically significant
at p < 0.01, which suggests that autocratic regimes with higher liberal component
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of democracy, such as civil liberties and rule of law, have higher chances to become
democracies, as Figure 7.1 (b) depicts. The liberal component of democracy focuses
on civil liberties and the constraints on the autocratic government. The constraints on
the executives may decrease autocratic government’s ability to violate civil liberties
and may weaken the exercises of the executive power. Under this circumstance,
citizens realize that government’s power has been constrained, which may increase
the incentives to ask for democratization as citizens know democratic institutions can
protect their civil liberties and rights.






Electoral −1 2.453∗∗∗ (0.663)
Liberal −1 2.728∗∗∗ (0.692)
Participatory −1 4.929∗∗∗ (0.877)
Economy
GDP per capita −1 0.348 (0.303) 0.365 (0.324) 0.388 (0.284)
Gini index−1 1.241 (1.935) 1.596 (1.952) 0.326 (1.945)
GDP−1* Gini−1 −0.883 (0.784) −0.941 (0.839) −0.952 (0.749)
Economic Growth 0.624 (1.400) 0.775 (1.412) 0.798 (1.443)
Former Communist −0.681 (0.458) −0.610 (0.475) −0.496 (0.448)
Islamic Culture −1.073∗∗ (0.488) −1.132∗∗ (0.493) −1.172∗∗ (0.484)
OPEC −0.972 (0.700) −0.786 (0.714) −1.287∗ (0.698)
Regional Dem. 0.779∗∗∗ (0.261) 0.888∗∗∗ (0.264) 0.645∗∗ (0.258)
Military coup 0.178 (0.218) 0.203 (0.218) 0.214 (0.213)
Constant −5.373∗∗∗ (0.894) −5.473∗∗∗ (0.898) −5.385∗∗∗ (0.878)
Observations 3,468 3,454 3,487
Log Likelihood −403.662 −406.096 −396.917
Akaike Inf. Crit. 831.324 836.193 817.835
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 905.140 909.960 891.716
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Figure 7.1: Political liberalization on Democratization (with 90% CI)
The third model is the result of the relationship between participatory component
of democracy and democratization. This model shows that participation democracy is
positive and statistically significant at p < 0.01, meaning that the active participation,
both electoral and non-electoral, is associated with democratization. Specifically, the
electoral element for this variable not only includes local and regional elections, but
also includes the non-electoral element. The non-electoral element of participation
refers to the engagement in civil society organizations (Coppedge et al., 2016). This
type of political liberalization describes citizens ability in organizing their civil society
organizations, which helps them to pursue their collective interests and ideals. Hence,
this implies that solving collective action problems becomes possible in autocratic
regimes if citizens have been granted the rights to organize civil society organizations.
Therefore, the likelihood of democratization thus increased.
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Electoral component−1 0.054 (0.935) −0.227 (1.007)
Liberal component−1 0.883 (0.927) 0.962 (1.002)
Participatory component−1 5.225∗∗∗ (1.020) 4.527∗∗∗ (1.043)
GDP per capita−1 0.382 (0.295)
Gini index−1 0.252 (1.986)
GDP−1*Gini−1 −0.950 (0.776)
Economic Growth 0.651 (1.456)
Former Communist −0.457 (0.461)
Islamic Culture −1.176∗∗ (0.494)
OPEC −1.167 (0.711)
Regional Democracy 0.680∗∗ (0.268)
Military coup 0.210 (0.216)
Constant −5.745∗∗∗ (0.373) −5.512∗∗∗ (0.920)
Observations 3,877 3,435
Log Likelihood −443.287 −391.774
Akaike Inf. Crit. 896.573 811.548
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 927.887 897.533
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
All three models show that all types of political liberalization are associated with
democratization. However, when I add all three types of political liberalization into
the same model (see Table 7.2), only the participatory component of democracy is
associated with democratization. As depicted by Figure 7.2. Both the electoral
component and the liberal component of democracy are not significant. A possible
explanation is that organizing social groups or social movement and the participation
in these activities may be more decisive in pushing the autocratic government to
step down. Election, civil liberties, and rule of law are certainly very important, but
participation may put more pressure on the autocratic government, such as protest
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Figure 7.2: The Effect of the Participatory Component of Democracy on Democratization
from Table 7.2
election and step down, or simply just leave the office before holding the election.
However, it does not mean democratization can happen without having the electoral
and liberal components of democracy. As mentioned, elections give the oppositions
the opportunity to be part of the decision making process, which may provide the
chances for the legislations on civil liberties, rule of law, and participation.
7.2.1 Two cases: Singapore and Malaysia
Singapore and Malaysia are both considered as non-democratic or semi-democratic
or partly free countries even we use different dataset. Both countries are holding
regular national election periodically with universal suffrage and party competition.
In 2019, Malaysia had it first government turnover in Malaysia’s modern history, the
opposition Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition defeated the incumbent Barisan National
(BN) coalition in May general elections in 2019. It brought an end to more than six
decades of rule by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its allies.
In meantime, the Singaporean government has been dominated by the ruling People’s
Action Party (PAP) and the family of current prime minister Lee Hsien Loong since









































Figure 7.3: Electoral Component and Participatory Component of democracy in Singa-
pore and Malaysia (2000-2019, source: V-Dem dataset)
parliament. As Figure 7.3(a) shows, there is not much difference of the electoral com-
ponent of democracy between Singapore and Malaysia after 2016. If both countries
hold similar levels of the electoral component of democracy, why did Malaysia expe-
rience government turnover while Singapore still remain an authoritarian one party
rule? We may argue that the loss of UMNO may be attributed to the corruption of
the Najib administration. But I if same happens in Singapore, citizens may not be
able to remove the PAP administration from office even they have elections.
As my theory suggests, the participatory component of democracy provides cit-
izens the ability to solve the collective action problem. Compared to Singapore,
Malaysia is relatively poor and unequal (GDP per capita was $3,800 and the Gini
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index was 46 in 2000), which may be associated with higher political liberalization,
including the participatory component of democracy. Figure 7.3(b) illustrates that
the levels of participatory component of democracy in Singapore and Malaysia be-
tween 2000 and 2019. The differences between two countries is approximately 0.45
across this time period. This difference in the levels of participatory component of
democracy may provide a good explanation.
High levels of participation imply that citizens have the capacity to form civil
society organizations and to organize events and activities more freely, which may
help them to coordinate their members more efficiently. Malaysia’s Prime Minister
Najib Razak was accused of corruption in 2015, which was critical to the 2018 general
elections. The high levels of participation may help the oppositions in Malaysia to
coordinate their supporters to vote against the incumbent party. Malaysia’s 2018
general election may not be the best example because Malaysia is still not consid-
ered as a democracy. But the turnover sends a message to demonstrate that high
participation may have higher chances to remove the incumbent in autocracies. If
the same political scandal happens in Singapore, since the levels of participation is
low, it may be harder for the oppositions to coordinate or mobilize their supporters
to vote against the PAP.
This may help us to understand why participatory component of democracy pre-
dicts higher probability of democratization than electoral component of democracy in
Figure 7.1. The results extends the research by Lindberg (2009) that election may not
be the only driving force for democratization, participation is also play an important
role.
7.3 Robustness check
According to Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)’s minimalist coding of democ-
ratization, the coding rules include the following four guidelines: First, the chief
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executive must be chosen by popular election; Second, the legislative branch must be
popularly elected; Third, there must be more than one political party competing in
the elections. Fourth, an alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the
ones that brought the incumbent to office must have taken place. According to these
four coding guidelines, democratization can be defined as having free and fair election
that elects a new head of the executive. This means that the level of electoral com-
ponent of democracy is also very high during the year of democratic transition. Since
the level of the electoral component of democracy during the year of democratization
is highly correlated with democratization, this is the reason why I avoid using it as
the predictor in the previous models. In my democratization models, I lagged the
components of democracy for one year as a predictor to avoid bias.
In my theory, I am not assuming that high electoral component can always remove
the autocratic incumbent from office through elections. The electoral component
means more opportunities for citizens to learn the advantages of having democracy.
That is, the electoral component may not only play an important role in elections,
but may also help citizens to be more engaged in both political and non-political
processes. A high electoral component is certainly correlated with democratization
(the coding), but this electoral component may not always remain at the same level
prior to democratization, it may continue to increase/decrease in some circumstance.
There is no true cut-point of the level of electoral component for democratization.
But higher may always be better, it is the fertilizer for democratization to grow. In
order to get a more robustness result to understand the effect electoral component
of democracy on democratization, I also lag this variable for three years and for
five years. The results in Table 7.3 show that electoral component−1 and electoral
component−3 are significant, but electoral component−5 is not significant. Figure
7.3 (c) also shows that the probability of democratization for electoral component−5
remains low regardless the changes of electoral component of democracy. As we move
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Electoral −1 2.453∗∗∗ (0.663)
Electoral −3 1.382∗∗ (0.657)
Electoral −5 0.827 (0.671)
GDP per capita−1 0.348 (0.303) 0.345 (0.301) 0.358 (0.300)
Gini index−1 1.241 (1.935) 1.329 (1.943) 1.158 (1.954)
GDP−1*Gini−1 −0.883 (0.784) −0.861 (0.777) −0.899 (0.776)
Economic Growth 0.624 (1.400) 0.553 (1.417) 0.534 (1.427)
Former Communist −0.681 (0.458) −0.744∗ (0.443) −0.844∗ (0.446)
Islamic Culture −1.073∗∗ (0.488) −1.072∗∗ (0.468) −1.114∗∗ (0.468)
OPEC −0.972 (0.700) −0.898 (0.671) −0.881 (0.666)
Regional Dem. 0.779∗∗∗ (0.261) 0.873∗∗∗ (0.257) 0.941∗∗∗ (0.259)
Military coup 0.178 (0.218) 0.150 (0.231) 0.194 (0.231)
Constant −5.373∗∗∗ (0.894) −4.871∗∗∗ (0.888) −4.501∗∗∗ (0.883)
Observations 3,468 3,270 3,069
Log Likelihood −403.662 −394.003 −385.624
Akaike Inf. Crit. 831.324 812.006 795.247
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 905.140 885.116 867.596
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
from electoral component−5 to electoral component−3 (Figure 7.3 (b)) and electoral
component−1 (Figure 7.3 (a)), the probability of democratization increases when the
level electoral component increases.
A possible explanation is that citizens were still learning from electoral compo-
nent of democracy/semi-democratic institutions five years prior to democratization.
Citizens have not yet developed pro-democracy attitudes and become less respectful
toward the authority. As they continue to practice and accrue their knowledges and
experiences about democratic institutions for a more longer period, the likelihood of
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(c) Electoral Component lagged for five
years
Figure 7.4: Effects of Electoral Component on Democratization (1960-2010, with 90% CI)
democracy is not only the correlation with the binary coding of democratization. It
may have a causal relationship with democratization, that citizens are leaning from
practicing with semi-democratic institutions. I also present similar models for the lib-
eral component and participatory component of democracy in Table B.1 and Table
B.2 in the Appendix. The results for the liberal component are similar with models
of the electoral component of democracy, suggesting that citizens are also learning
from it, which may become the force to help democratization. But the participatory
component−5 is still significant, suggesting that participation may be more important
than other components of democracy.
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7.4 Summary
This chapter presents the relationship between different types of political liberaliza-
tion and the binary coding of democratization. The results confirm the hypothe-
ses that political liberalization is associated with democratization, and the electoral
component, liberal component, and participatory components of democracy may con-
tribute to higher likelihood of democratization.
Previous studies only focus on the effect of elections on democratization in au-
tocratic regimes, some suggest negative and some suggest positive relationship with
democratization (e.g. Lindberg, 2009). The findings in this chapter expands previous
studies that elections in autocratic regimes may not be the only factor that pro-
motes or harms democratization. Liberal component and participatory component
of democracy may also increase with the help of electoral component of democracy.
These two types of political liberalization may play important roles in helping citizens
to learn about the benefits of democratic institutions. They may also mediate the
effect of the electoral component on democratization.
This chapter also shows the evidence that citizens may learn from the use of
democratic institutions and civil liberties before they look for democratization. De-
mocratization is a long progressing movement, which involves the gradual increase
of political liberalization. This movement gives citizens the opportunities to think




8.1 Main findings of this dissertation
This dissertation demonstrates an important conditional relationship linking income
inequality, economic development, political liberalization, and democratization. First
of all, income inequality and economic development do not directly lead to democ-
ratization, both are associated with political liberalization. Second, I discuss the
conditional effect of economic development on income inequality, where rich and
equal, poor and unequal autocratic regimes are associated with higher political liber-
alization. Third, to be more specific, these two types of countries are associated with
higher levels of electoral component, liberal component, and participatory component
of democracy, which are important to democratization.
Therefore, this dissertation can conclude that democratization is a long process
that citizens are learning from practicing with democratic institutions. It involves
gradual changes of political liberalization due to income inequality and economic
development.
This dissertation speaks to studies in comparative political institutions, political
economy, and democratization. My prediction provides an alternative path to think
about democratization, which is based on modernization theory and redistributive
conflict theory. Modernization theory predicts rich countries may democratize, but
my model and the empirical evidence shows that an equal society in a rich country is
more likely to do so, while democratization becomes less likely for an unequal society
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in a rich country. Redistributive conflict theory emphasizes the effect of income
inequality on democratization, but I also consider the conditional effect of economic
development. My model shows that a highly unequal country may democratize, but
only if that country is poor. Citizens in unequal and rich countries, such as Singapore,
have less incentive to ask for democracy. This prediction is different from Acemoglu
and Robinson (2005), who argued that as an equally rich country, is less likely to
democratize. When I use Gini coefficient as a standardize measurement of income
inequality, Singapore can be classified as an unequal society.
Miller (2012) suggests that a good economy may build a hierarchical society and
therefore may maintain the authoritarian rule. Solt (2012) also finds that economic
inequality within countries shapes individuals’ feelings toward authority, which are
more likely to lead citizens to view hierarchical relations as natural and to hold
greater deference toward authority. But my theory suggests that an equal society in
rich country may be less hierarchical because citizens may not rely on the government
to provide economic opportunities. Also, an unequal society in poor country may not
develop a hierarchical society since the government may have less capacity to provide
economic opportunities to poor citizens.
8.2 Limitations of this research
8.2.1 The first move
This dissertation expands political economy approach to democratization by dis-
cussing the two-stage process of democratization, which involves the conditional effect
of economic development on income inequality on political liberalization in the first
stage, and the effect of political liberalizations on democratization in the second stage.
But this study provides only a little information to tell the readers when a country
start to increase levels of political liberalization in the first stage of democratization,
and when country then become a democracy.
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Many of the democratization theories identify the turning point of moving from
autocracy to democracy. For example, in Acemoglu and Robinson (2005)’s founda-
tional work, income inequality makes democratization more threatening to the elites,
but how elites react to income inequality depends on the seriousness of the threat
of revolution and the cost of repression. For the threat of revolution, income in-
equality may increase the threat of revolution. For the cost of repression, they claim
that economic crisis decreases revolution’s cost to the poor and increases the cost
of repression to the rich. Therefore, democratization is likely to occur in moments
of economic crisis with income inequality. Brückner and Ciccone (2011)’s research
also supports the claim that economic crisis generates “windows of opportunity” for
democratization in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa.
Besides Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), Boix (2003) also suggests that capital
mobility reduces elites fears of democracy, therefore, countries with high capital mo-
bility increases the likelihood of democratization when income inequality is low. High
capital mobility limits the ability to tax assets of either the ruler or the voters. With
capital mobility, elites’ assets will be relocated in countries that are offering lower
taxes. That is, the costs of democracy decreases for elites, and elites are more likely
to accept democratization because of the decreasing ability to tax and redistribute
wealth from capital.
Both seminal works show the critical turning points in their democratization the-
ories, which gives readers the information when does democratization start to take
place. In my theory and empirical findings, I suggest that the interaction of income in-
equality and economic development is associated with political liberalizations, where
rich and equal autocracy and poor and unequal autocracy have higher chances to
increase political liberalizations. But when does an autocracy start to initiate or
launch political reforms to increase political liberalizations? Was there a shock, ei-
ther endogenous or exogenous, to trigger the increase of political liberalizations?
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In my theory, there is a demand for political liberalization from citizens in rich and
equal and poor and unequal countries. For those three types of political liberaliza-
tions, I identify the possible time point for the liberal component and the participatory
component of democracy to increase. It may be after citizens gained the electoral
component of democracy. However, when the electoral component democracy starts
to increase is ambiguous. I assume that citizens are “aware” that becoming part of
the decision making process may help them to fulfill their demands. The government
also is aware that temporarily fulfilling the demands may help them to stay in power
longer. Those awarenesses may require a long and constant interactions between citi-
zens and the government. It is not easy to identify the “actual” time point or the “cut
point” for an autocracy to accept the fact that they need to launch political reforms.
My empirical evidences can only tell the readers that the high political liberalizations
are associated with rich and equal country and poor and unequal country.
8.2.2 Are citizens really learning from political liberalizations?
This learning experience in the semi-democratic regime is critical in my theory, but
how do the readers know citizens in such autocratic regimes are really learning? Hunt-
ington (1991) proposes that the snowballing effect may help other countries to learn
from other democracies, which makes other countries to believe in the desirability or
necessity of democratization.
In my theory, I suggest that citizens are learning the advantages of democracy
from living in semi-democratic regimes in the second stage of the process of de-
mocratization. This learning experience may help citizens to develop pro-democracy
attitude and may make them to realize that they may not need to rely on the author-
itarian regime to provide public goods. The empirical evidence shows that the levels
of political liberalizations at least three years and five years prior to democratization
have less effect on democratization. It “implies” that citizens were not ready yet
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because they were still learning. High political liberalizations may be helpful, but
citizens need more time to learn from practicing. But how many years citizens need
for accumulating enough experiences in order to ask for democratization is still not
clear in my theory and empirical findings.
I also thought about using the number of years of the experience to examine if
longer experience is associated with democratization. This approach may encounter
some problems. First, when is the start year of this learning process is not clear. The
values of all three components of democracy come form V-Dem dataset, this project
uses a Bayesian Item Response Theory model to generate latent estimates and to
correct for potential biases. Since each year contains different information for specific
countries, the value changes from year to year varies from very small to vary large.
Does small value changes means the start year of the learning process? I will need
more theoretical argument to make it more clear.
8.3 Political Implications and Future Research
8.3.1 Social unrest and protests in autocratic regimes
The results suggest that citizens in rich and equal autocratic countries and poor and
unequal autocratic countries may prefer democracy over autocracy after they learned
from political liberalization. The changes of income inequality and economic devel-
opment are important because both economic indicators do not just influence the
demand for democracy, but also pressure the regime to make changes. In autocratic
countries, if more and more citizens are aware that income inequality is increasing,
they might further engage in protests, conflict or even revolution, which can poten-
tially destabilize the autocratic regime or even can bring democratization.
Therefore, an extension of research from this dissertation might examine the re-
lationship between income inequality and the engagement in protests in autocratic
countries. In non-democratic countries, autocratic rule itself makes it difficult for
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citizens to facilitate successful collective actions, and high income inequality contin-
ues to erodes citizens’ ability to protest (Solt, 2008). Since protest may be rare in
non-democracies, we would expect to see fewer protests when income inequality is
high. I could argue that this negative association is conditional on the levels of polit-
ical liberalization. For an autocracy that has a high level of political liberalization,
such as electoral authoritarianism, high income inequality is positively associated
with protests. That is, facilitating collective action is still likely to occur in electoral
authoritarianism, which may lead by opposition party leaders or other civil society
organizations. For an autocracy that has a low level of political liberalization, high
perceived income inequality is less likely to motivate people to participate in protests,
which is what the conventional wisdom suggests.
8.3.2 Income inequality in new democracies
Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that democracy sends a more credible signal
of the willingness to redistribute, and that citizens prefer democracy over autocracy
when inequality is high. Therefore, we should expect to see lower income inequality
in democracies. For policymakers in democratic countries, if income inequality can
be the motivation to remove autocratic government and to be replaced by democratic
government, then income inequality could also be an important factor in sustaining
democratic institutions.
The 2020 Freedom House report shows that Hungary is no longer a democracy
(Csaky, 2020). The Gini index for Hungary is still low, but it has increased steadily
every year (Solt, 2019). Hence, another extended research is to discuss if a rising
income inequality can jeopardize democratic institutions, especially for new democ-
racies. We can also see if citizens show less support for democracy when income
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 5
Table A.1: The List of the 125 Countries
African
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde
Central African Republic, Chad,Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Republic of the Congo, CÃťte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea
Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Libya
Lesotho, Liberia,Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia
South Africa, Sudan, Eswatini, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Asia
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China
Georgia, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, N. Korea, S. Korea, Laos, Lebanon
Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Fiji
Europe Albania, Argentina, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,Greece, HungaryPoland Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey
America
Antigua, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador
Grenada, Guatemala Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
Table A.2: Numbers of Democratic Transition
Democratic
Transition
Albania(3), Antigua(1), Argentina(3), Armenia(1), Bangladesh(3), Benin(1)
Bhutan(1), Bolivia(2)Brazil(1), Bulgaria(1), Burundi(2), Cape Verde(1)
Central Africa Republic(1), Chile(1), Comoros(2), Republic of Congo(1), Croatia(1)
Cyprus(1), Dominican Republic(1), Ecuador(2), El Salvador(1), Fiji(1), Gambia(1)
Georgia(1),Ghana(4), Greece(1), Grenada(1), Guatemala(2), Guinea-Biss(3)
Guyana(1), Honduras(3), Hungary(1), Indonesia(1), kazakhstan(1), Kenya(1)
South Korea(2), Latvia(1), Lebanon(1), Lesotho(1), Liberia(1), Lithuania(1)
Madagascar(1), Malawi(1), Maldives(1), Mali(1), Mauritania(1), Mexico(1)
Mongolia(1), Mozambique(1), Myanmar(1), Nepal(2), Nicaragua(1), Niger(2)
Nigeria(2), Pakistan(2), Panama(1), Paraguay(2), Peru(3), Phillipines(1)
Poland(1), Portugal(1), Romania(1), Sao Tome(1), Sengal(1), Sierra Leone(3)
Solomon Is.(1), South Africa(1), Spain(1), Sri Lanka(1), Sudan(3), Suriname(2)
Taiwan(1), Thailand(4), Turkey(2), Uganda(1), Uruguay(1), Zambia(1)
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 7, Part I
B.1 Tables for Lagged Liberal and Lagged Participatory
component of democracy





Liberal −1 2.728∗∗∗ (0.692)
Liberal −3 0.975 (0.666)
Liberal −5 0.364 (0.681)
GDP per capita−1 0.365 (0.324) 0.340 (0.309) 0.376 (0.295)
Gini index−1 1.596 (1.952) 1.584 (1.922) 1.470 (1.918)
GDP−1*Gini−1 −0.941 (0.839) −0.841 (0.796) −0.936 (0.767)
Economic Growth 0.775 (1.412) 0.779 (1.413) 0.716 (1.416)
Former Communist −0.610 (0.475) −0.745∗ (0.443) −0.861∗ (0.444)
Islamic Culture −1.132∗∗ (0.493) −1.070∗∗ (0.461) −1.090∗∗ (0.462)
OPEC −0.786 (0.714) −0.834 (0.665) −0.887 (0.665)
Regional Dem. 0.888∗∗∗ (0.264) 0.923∗∗∗ (0.252) 0.962∗∗∗ (0.254)
Military coup 0.203 (0.218) 0.169 (0.229) 0.190 (0.232)
Constant −5.473∗∗∗ (0.898) −4.735∗∗∗ (0.874) −4.408∗∗∗ (0.863)
Observations 3,454 3,256 3,055
Log Likelihood −406.096 −398.862 −389.970
Akaike Inf. Crit. 836.193 821.725 803.939
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 909.960 894.784 876.234
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Participatory −1 4.929∗∗∗ (0.877)
Participatory −3 3.251∗∗∗ (0.841)
Participatory −5 2.731∗∗∗ (0.857)
GDP per capita−1 0.388 (0.284) 0.402 (0.277) 0.360 (0.287)
Gini −1 0.326 (1.945) 0.751 (1.939) 0.448 (1.960)
GDP−1*Gini−1 −0.952 (0.749) −0.991 (0.726) −0.895 (0.749)
Economic Growth 0.798 (1.443) 0.639 (1.434) 0.691 (1.432)
Former Communist −0.496 (0.448) −0.643 (0.432) −0.735∗ (0.434)
Islamic culture −1.172∗∗ (0.484) −1.137∗∗ (0.463) −1.146∗∗ (0.462)
OPEC −1.287∗ (0.698) −1.121∗ (0.670) −1.068 (0.667)
Regional Dem. 0.645∗∗ (0.258) 0.747∗∗∗ (0.253) 0.827∗∗∗ (0.256)
Military coup 0.214 (0.213) 0.156 (0.228) 0.191 (0.229)
Constant −5.385∗∗∗ (0.878) −4.927∗∗∗ (0.855) −4.582∗∗∗ (0.850)
Observations 3,487 3,289 3,088
Log Likelihood −396.917 −392.483 −385.462
Akaike Inf. Crit. 817.835 808.967 794.925
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 891.716 882.147 867.348
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix for Chapter 7, Part II
C.1 Polity IV Score as the Dependent Variable
Some scholars, such as Haggard and Kaufman (2016a) and Freeman and Quinn
(2012), use Polity IV scores as the dependent variable to measure democratization.
Therefore, I also use Polity IV to measure it as the robustness check. The result for
Model 2 shows that the interaction between GDP per capita and the Gini index is
significant and negatively associated with Polity Scores. This result suggests that rich
and unequal countries are more likely to have a lower Polity Score, which is similar
to the main results of this dissertation.
C.2 Rare Event Models
In addition to use Polity IV scores as the dependent variable, I also use rare event
model to estimate the effect on the interaction when the dependent variable is binary
coding of democratization. As mentioned, the number of democratic transition is
108 since 1960, which is 2.6% in the dataset. The results for Model 2 in Table B.2
shows that the interaction between economic development and income inequality is
very closed to the significance at p<0.1. Also, the direction is negative, which is the
same as the previous models.
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Electoral Component 13.229∗∗∗ (0.588) 12.911∗∗∗ (0.617)
Liberal Component 5.850∗∗∗ (0.663) 6.317∗∗∗ (0.694)
Participatory Component 6.024∗∗∗ (0.718) 6.183∗∗∗ (0.751)
GDP per capita 0.210 (0.142) 0.220 (0.142)
Gini Index 2.778∗∗∗ (0.871) 2.375∗∗∗ (0.901)
GDP*Gini −0.563 (0.343) −0.579∗ (0.344)
Economic Growth −0.528 (0.561)
Former Soviet 0.346 (0.642)
Islamic Culture −0.412 (0.684)
OPEC countries −0.037 (0.773)
Democracy Neighbors 0.273 (0.194)
Military Coup 0.125 (0.121)
Constant −14.095∗∗∗ (0.441) −14.090∗∗∗ (0.501)
Observations 3,700 3,486
Log Likelihood −9,026.639 −8,489.296
Akaike Inf. Crit. 18,071.280 17,008.590
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Electoral Component 0.43 (0.81) −0.115 (0.891)
Liberal Component 0.27(0.77) 0.549 (0.855)
Participatory Component 4.42∗∗∗ (0.83) 4.032∗∗∗ (0.862)
GDP per capita 0.345 (0.252) 0.422 (0.267)
Gini Index 0.663 (1.69) −0.020 (1.818)
GDP*Gini −0.897 (0.662) −1.017 (0.708)
Economic Growth 0.714 (1.410)
Former Soviet −0.462 (0.395)
Islamic Culture −0.923 (0.408)
OPEC countries −0.892 (0.614)
Democracy Neighbors 0.640 (0.228)
Military Coup 0.386(0.201)
Observations 3,688 3,486
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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